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ABSTRACT
What's the Meaning of "This"?:
A Puzzle about Demonstrative Belief
September, 1985
David F. Austin, B.A., University of Rochester
M.A., Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Edmund L. Gettier, III
In recent literature in the philosophy of mind and language, one finds a
variety of examples that raise serious problems for the traditional analysis
of belief as a two-term relation between a believer and a proposition. My
main purpose in this essay is to provide a critical test case for any theory of
the propositional attitudes, and to demonstrate that this case really does
present an unsolved puzzle. Chapter I defines the traditional, propositional
analysis of belief, and then introduces a distinction, motivated by the intui-
tions that underlie Kripke's arguments for direct reference, between purely
qualitative and individual propositions. Beliefs typically expressed using
proper names, indexicals or demonstratives appear to relate the believer to
individual propositions with the entity that may be referred to as subject
constituent. Chapter II presents the critical test case (the Two Tubes case).
In this and Chapters III - VI it is used to show that the latter sorts of beliefs
are not analyzable as dyadically relating the believer to individual (or purely
qualitative) propositions. The case constitutes a genuine counterexample to
IX
the traditional analysis only if (a) it is possible for a believer to believe an
individual proposition with a contingent thing other than herself as a
constituent; and (b) the believer in the case is in optimum conditions for
believing an individual proposition. In Chapters III, IV and VI, I criticize
views prompted by rejection of (a) (Schiffer, Russell, Plantinga, Ackerman,
Chisholm, Lewis), and in Chapter V, I criticize Stalnaker's view, which rejects
(b). Chapter VI also considers the non-traditional, triadic analyses of belief
proposed by Kaplan and Richard; they fall prey to the main criticisms of
Chapter V. In the Postscript, I give a comparative assessment of approaches
to resolving the Two Tubes Puzzle, and I place it in historical context by
pointing out the puzzle's similarities to the problem of sense data' (as it
bedevils Direct Realism in the theory of perception). Correlatively, I indicate
the bearing of Methodological Solipsism on future attempts to solve the
puzzle. My conclusion is that although the puzzle remains a puzzle, it gives
us reason to supplement, rather than completely abandon, the use of
propositions in the analysis of thought; and I say what a supplementing
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In recent literature on philosophy of mind and language, one can find
a variety of examples that raise serious problems for the traditional analysis
of belief (and the other so-called propositional attitudes') as a two-term
relation between a believer and a proposition 1 . The most well known
examples involve beliefs typically expressed using indexicals 2 or proper
names^. Because of the attractiveness of the traditional analysis, and the
initial absence of any clear alternative, these examples raise genuine puzzles
about belief. My purpose here is to provide a critical test case for any
theory of propositional attitudes by presenting (in Chapter II) a puzzle about
beliefs typically expressed using demonstratives; and to convince the reader
that "...the puzzle is a puzzle. Because the puzzle I present can equally well
be construed as a puzzle about beliefs typically expressed using proper
names, it may also be viewed as a sharpened version of Kripke's puzzled
Adding a puzzle about demonstrative belief is also useful since it will help to
show that all three types of puzzles are on a par (contrary to what some
writers have suggested), and deserve one solution.
What I'm Not Going to do Here
But the reader will find no proposal for solution here. I attempt to go
no further than a clear statement of the problem, with a few suggestions
about constraints on any plausible solution.
1
2
Nor do I attempt a comprehensive survey of ail, or even all of the
best, theories of belief that might reasonably be applied to solve the puzzle.
Instead, I discuss what I believe to be the best and most clearly formulated
views that address the puzzle at its three main points6 .
Absent from even this extremely restricted survey is any discussion
of avowedly and essentially Functionalist theories of belief. At the time of
this writing, I have found no such theory that is as clearly formulated as the
theories that I do discuss. I might also note that Functionalism has been
repudiated by one of its originators7
,
and a refutation of it has been offered
which I find conclusive8 .
Although I have characterized my focus linguistically, by referring to
certain parts of speech, my concern here is with the beliefs typically
expressed using those terms, and not primarily with the linguistic
mechanisms involved in their thought or expression9 . One moral that might
plausibly be drawn from this essay is that extremely detailed attention will
have to be paid to the nature of such mechanisms if there is ever to be any
real progress made in solving the puzzles, but this is not an essay in formal
semantics or philosophy of linguistics, and I do not undertake that detailed
attention 10 . So, for the sake of simplicity, I usually restrict my attention to
beliefs expressed by the simplest subject-predicate sentences. There are
problems enough, and deep enough, raised by these examples.
Furthermore, I assiduously avoid the problems raised by third-person
belief attributions 11 . Every puzzle I want to discuss is expressible using
first- person belief sentences ( T believe that p "), although I occasionally
depart from this stricture for the sake of convenience or stylistic variety.
Finally, I should note that beliefs typically expressed using proper
names, demonstratives or indexicals (or some subset thereof) are taken by
some philosophers as paradigms of belief de re. and some of the vast and
labyrinthine literature on belief so-called is certainly relevant here. But it is
not my goal to guide the reader through that labyrinth. What I want to say
can, I think, be said without ever again using the term belief de re ". So the
use of it in the first sentence of this paragraph will be my last use of it in
this essay 12 .
The time has come to talk of propositional things.
Propositions
One of the earliest modern descriptions of the notion of proposition is
found in Bertrand Russell's "Meinong s Theory of Complexes and
Assumptions'' 13
,
where he credits Frege, Meinong and G. E. Moore with a
similar notion:
That every presentation and every belief must have an object
other than itself and, except in certain cases where mental
existents happen to be concerned, extra-mental; that what is
commonly called perception has as its object an existential
proposition, into which enters as a constituent that whose
existence is concerned, and not the idea of this existent; that
truth and falsehood apply not to beliefs, but to their objects;
and that the object of a thought, even when this object does not
exist, has a Being which is in no way dependent upon its being
an object of thought: all these are theses which, though
generally rejected, can nevertheless be supported by arguments
which deserve at least a refutation 1 *
.
The hardiness of the notion, at least, is attested to by its survival, largely
intact, during the eighty years since Russell wrote. Echoing the essentials of
OJ
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what John Perry has recently called "the doctrine of propositions"^, Robert
Stalnaker writes,
It is at least initially plausible to assume that 0 Leary's
believing that pigs can fly is a relation between the man
0 Leary and an abstract object - call it a proposition - which is
denoted by the expression that pies can flv To make this
assumption is not to say very much about what sort of things
propositions are: they might be complexes made up of concepts
and objects, sentences of some ideal language of thought,
equivalence classes of sentence tokens, functions from possible
worlds into truth values. The doctrine. ..is independent of the
details of one s theory about the nature of propositional objects;
all that is essential is that propositions have truth values that
do not vary from time to time, person to person, or place to
place. If propositions are identified with sentences or meanings
of sentences, they must be eternal sentences, or meanings of
eternal sentences. If propositions are identified with functions
taking truth and falsity as values, they must take possible
worlds as their arguments, and not indices that may have
different values in the same world.
The received doctrine may be summed up in two theses:
1 . Belief is a relation between an animate subject and an
abstract object which we will call, without prejudging its nature,
a proposition.
2. Propositions have truth values, and their truth values do not
vary with time, place or person 16 .
Perry adds a third thesis, with which Stalnaker concurs 17 :
The third (thesis) has to do with how we individuate ...
(propositions). It is necessary, for that S and that S' to be the
same, that they have the same truth-value. But it is not
sufficient, for that the sea is salty and that milk is white are not
the same proposition. It is necessary that they have the same
truth condition, in the sense that they attribute to the same
objects the same relation. But this is also not sufficient, for that
Atlanta is the capital of Georgia and that Atlanta is the capital of
the largest state east of the Mississippi are not the same
proposition. Carter, it seems, might believe the first but not the
second. ...propositions must be individuated in a more "fine-
grained" way than is provided bv truth-value or the notion (of)
truth-condition employed above 18
Just how fine-grained the individuation conditions for propositions
must be is a subject of some dispute 19 , but there is wide agreement that, for
propositions p and q, p = q only if it is logically necessary that p is true if
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and only if q is true. (We will see examples in Chapter II which suggest that
the converse is false, but the issue is not one that I attempt to resolve in this
essay.) In what follows, I will assume the latter necessary condition for
propositional identity, along with the two theses stated by Stalnaker, when I
make use of the notion of proposition. I will also assume, with Russell and
other writers, that it is not only belief that is a two-term relation between a
thinking subject and a proposition, but that the so-called "propositional
attitudes may also, according to the traditional doctrine of propositions, be
analyzed in similar fashion. Thus, O'Leary's knowing that cows give milk is
to be analyzed as his bearing the two-term knowing relation to the
proposition that cows give milk; his wondering whether cows can fly is to be
analyzed as his bearing the wondering relation to the proposition that cows
can fly; his fearing that cows can fly is to be analyzed as his bearing the
fearing relation to the proposition that cows can fly; and similarly for
disbelieving, hoping, wishing, thinking, considering and a variety of other
cognitive states. Although the doctrine is usually taken to apply to non-
occurrent (dispositional) states, as well as to occurrent states - so that for
example, O'Leary may continue to bear the believing relation to that cows
give milk while he dreams of flying pigs - my use of it will, for the most
part, involve occurrent belief. For the sake of simplicity in exposition, I will
avoid using the brand of the doctrine that makes propositions equivalence
classes of uses of sentence tokens (perhaps under the relation has the same
meaning as ’); instead, I will use the complexes and possible worlds brands.
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Propositions: Purely Qualitative and Individual
There are some philosophers 20 who make a significant additional
claim about the nature of the objects of belief. They say that all such objects
are purely qualitative and deny that they are individual. In the literature,
one finds several ways of characterizing the complementary notions of
purely qualitative proposition and individual proposition. None of the
characterizations is pellucid, but one can get a tolerably clear idea of what is
meant by considering several of them, and considering them in application.
The most common characterizations of purely qualitative propositions
are negative and linguistic, and begin by talking about purely qualitative
properties, out of which the purely qualitative propositions are then
constructed' (or with reference to which their possible worlds truth
conditions are given). For example, Robert Adams writes
We might try to capture the idea (of a qualitative property) by
saying that a property is purely qualitative. ..if and only if it
could be expressed, in a language sufficiently rich, without the
aid of such referential devices as proper names, proper
adjectives and verbs (such as Leibnizian and pegasizes ),
indexical expressions, and referential uses of definite
descriptions21 .
The element of idealization here ("...a language sufficiently rich") and the
avoidability of the mentioned linguistic devices are two common features of
specifications of purely qualitative properties 22 . Adams offers another
characterization of the notion that depends on a prior understanding of a
certain sort of non- qualitative property, which he calls a "thisness":
A thisness is the property of being identical with a certain
particular individual - not the property that we all share, of
being identical with some individual or other, but my property
7
you^c j^
enl *ca^ me> y°ur P r°Perty of being identical with
...another and possibly more illuminating approach (than the
linguistic one quoted above) to the definition of 'suchness ^ (is
this). All properties that are, in certain senses general (capable
ol being possessed by different individuals) and nonrelational
are suchnesses. More precisely, let us say that a basic suchness
is a property that satisfies the following three conditions. ( 1 ) It
is not a thisness and is not equivalent to one. (2) It is not a
property of being related in one way or another to one or more
particular individuals (or to their thisnesses). This is not to
deny that some basic suchnesses are in a sense relational The
property of owning the house at 1011 Rose Avenue, Ann Arbor
Michigan, is not a basic suchness, although several different
individuals have had it, because it involves the thisness of that
particular house. But the property of being a homeowner is a
basic suchness, although relational, because having it does not
depend on which particular home one owns. (3) A basic
suchness is not a property of being identical with or related in
one way or another to an extensionally defined set that has an
individual among its members, or among its members
members, of among its members members members, etc. Thus,
if being an American is to be analyzed as a relation to a set of
actual people and places, it is not a basic suchness.
These three conditions may be taken as jointly sufficient for
being a suchness, but it is not clear that they are also necessary
for being a suchness. For it seems intuitively that any property
that is constructed by certain operations out of purely
qualitative properties must itself be purely qualitative. The
operations I have in mind for the construction are of two sorts.
( 1 ) They may be logical, such as those expressed by not', or
,
and TEx)0( ,x)\ (sic) where the property ascribed to x by
(Ex)0(y,x) is a basic suchness or constructed by allowed
operations out of basic suchnesses. Or (2) they may be
epistemic, such as those expressed by believes that p and
wishes that p , where p is a proposition constructed, by allowed
operations, solely out of basic suchnesses....
...let us define a suchness as a property that is either a basic
suchness or constructed out of basic suchnesses in such a way
as I have indicated^.
As Adams indicates in the passage just quoted, a notion of purely
qualitative proposition is immediately forthcoming from the characterization
he gives of purely qualitative property, if one buys the complexes brand of
the doctrine of propositions: such a proposition is one that has as its only
constituents purely qualitative properties. It is not my purpose, nor is it
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required by any purpose that I do have in this essay, to give a general
theory of propositional constituents (or, for that matter, to endorse any of
the already mentioned brands of the doctrine of propositions). I follow the
practice of Perry, Stalnaker, Heidelberger, and others in forming names of
propositions by underlining the that-clauses taken to express propositions;
and I will continue to speak of propositions as having constituents because
this provides a graphically vivid way of stressing claims about their truth
and belief conditions. Using the underlining convention, we may, for
example, say that the proposition that the tallest sov is wise is a purely
qualitative proposition, that it has the purely qualitative properties of being
a spy, being taller than, and wisdom as constituents, but that it has no
contingent individuals or thisnesses among its constituents. This proposition
is therefore true in any situation in which there is exactly one spy taller than
all others who is also wise; it does not require for its truth the existence of
the actual person (if any) who is in fact the tallest of all spies.
On the other hand, it is possible to construct representations
apparently of propositions of a different sort, individual (or, singular)
propositions, as they have been called. One such proposition might be the
proposition that I am mortal, with the properties of being identical to me
and mortality - my thisness and the purely qualitative property of mortality
- as constituents. Another, similar characterization of individual proposition
replaces the thisnesses with the the individuals of which they are properties.
Thus Kaplan writes, "...an individual may be an immediate element of a
proposition. In fact, certain atomic propositions consist of just individuals
and attributes (or relations)...."26 . On this view, the just-named individual
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proposition may aptly be represented by the ordered pair consisting of me
and the property of mortality: [me, Mortality]. I will make frequent use of
this sort of representation of individual propositions in the remainder of this
essay. Although the ordering of constituents in the representation is merely
an artifact and not alleged to be a property of the propositions themselves, it
may record an important fact about the proposition: it may indicate what
the subject of attribution is by putting it in first place. The proposition that I
am mortal is a different proposition from the proposition that mortality is
me, and it will be convenient to allow the difference to be reflected in the
representation.
Let us quote one last characterization of individual proposition, given
by Herbert Heidelberger in his "Belief and Propositions '":27
Let us think of a proposition...as something that can be believed,
and define what it is for an object to enter into a proposition as
follows:
x enters into p: There is a property F such that for anyone m,
necessarily m believes p if, and only if, m attributes F to x.
Making use of enters into" we can define "singular proposition",
p is a singular proposition: Something enters into p.
...the propositions that all men are mortal, that some men are
wise, and that the wisest man is mortal are general (purely
qualitative) and the propositions that you are wise, that I am
mortal, and that th(is) lectern is made of wood are singular^*.
As remarked at the beginning of this section, the complementary pair
of notions: purely qualitative proposition, individual proposition, is less than
wholly clear, but to get much clearer on them would require an essay as long
as the present one. For present purposes, the characterizations quoted from
Adams' paper will be serviceable in most instances. The most important fact
to keep in mind about an individual proposition is that a necessary condition
of its identity is the identity of the individuals that enter into its truth
10
conditions: the individual proposition represented by [x, F-ness] is true only
in those worlds where x itself exists and has F-ness (and, of course, the
property of being identical to x).
As already noted, some philosophers have claimed that all
propositions are purely qualitative; others have claimed, about each of a
more restricted kind of proposition that all of its members are purely
qualitative. For example, there are philosophers who have made such claims
about propositions typically expressed using proper names, those typically
expressed using indexicals (e g., "I", "here ", "now"), and those typically
expressed using demonstratives (e.g., "this
", "that"). Sosa2* appears to be an
instance of the former kind, and Chisholm 30 appears to be an example of the
latter. (Chisholm exempts "I" from the general claim, and holds that it, at
least, can be used by the believer to express an individual proposition,
representable with the believer's thisness as a constituent.) One claim with
which the aforementioned friends of the purely qualitative can agree is this:
either proper names, indexicals or demonstratives are typically used to
express purely qualitative propositions. If the sentence in question is "t is G"
(with "t" a proper name, indexical or demonstrative), then they would hold
that the proposition expressed by a particular use of the sentence is equally
well (and perhaps, more perspicuously) expressible by a sentence of the
form " the F is G ", where "F" expresses a contingent, purely qualitative
property of the thing thereby referred to. It is also often allowed that
different uses of "t" may be semantically associated in this way with
different definite descriptions and purely qualitative properties, depending,
for example, on features of the context of use of the term; it is, however,
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insisted that there always be some such associated description and
property 3 !. It has recently been argued, however, that each of the three
disjuncts of this weakened claim is false. Echoes of these arguments have
already been heard in the linguistic characterization of the difference
between purely qualitative and individual propositions. The intuitions on
which the arguments are based usually trade on (but need not conflate) both
epistemological intuitions about which propositions it is possible to believe,
and on metaphysical intuitions about which ordered sets represent existing
propositions. It is possible32 to separate these two kinds of intuitions, and for
example, to grant the existence of situations corresponding to individual
proposition representations, but to deny that they are accessible to belief; or
one might deny both their existence and their doxastic accessibility. The
latter, more robustly skeptical position will be under attack in this essay, but
much of what I have to say has force against the weaker, purely
epistemological skepticism 33 .
I will review two sorts of objections: modal and epistemic. I adopt the
modal objection from Kripke's Naming and Necessity . The epistemic
objection derives from work of Kripke's, Perry's and David Lewis'.
Krjoke's Modal Objection: What Aristotle Could Not Have Been
Consider:
( 1 ) Aristotle was fond of dogs.
A proper understanding of this statement involves an
understanding both of the (extensionally correct) conditions
under which it is in fact true, and of the conditions under which
a counterfactual course of history, resembling the actual course
in some respects but not in others, would be correctly
12
(partially) described by (1). Presumably everyone agrees that
there is a certain man - the philosopher we call Aristotle - such
that, as a matter of fact, ( 1 ) is true if and only if he was fond of
dogs. (Footnote: That is, everyone, even Russell, would agree
that this is a true material equivalence, given that there really
was an Aristotle.) The thesis of rigid designation is simply -
subtle points aside - (Footnote: In particular, we ignore the
question what to say about counterfactual situations in which
Aristotle would not have existed....) that the same paradigm
applies to the truth conditions of ( 1 ) as it describes
counterfactual situations. That is ( 1 ) truly describes a
counterfactual situation if and only if the same aforementioned
man would have been fond of dogs, had that situation obtained.
(Forget the counterfactual situations in which he would not
have existed.) By contrast, Russell thinks that ( 1 ) should be
analyzed as something like (Footnote: Taking the last great
philosopher of antiquity' to be the definite description Russell
associates with Aristotle ....):
(2) The last great philosopher of antiquity was fond of dogs,
and that this in turn should be analyzed as
(3) Exactly one person was last among the great philosophers of
antiquity, and any such person was fond of dogs.
The actual truth conditions of (3) agree extensionally with those
mentioned above for ( 1 ), assuming that Aristotle was the last
great philosopher of antiquity. But counterfactually, Russell's
conditions can vary wildly from those supposed by the rigidity
thesis. With respect to a counterfactual situation where
someone other than Aristotle would have been the last great
philosopher of antiquity, Russell's criterion would make that
other person s fondness for dogs the relevant issue for the
correctness of (I)! 3 **
The doctrine of rigidity supposes that a painting or picture
purporting to represent a situation correctly described by ( 1
)
must ipso facto purport to depict Aristotle himself as fond of
dogs. No picture, purporting to represent someone else and his
fondness for dogs, even if it depicts the other individual as
possessing all the properties we use to identify Aristotle,
represents a counterfactual situation correctly described by ( 1 ).
Doesn't this, in itself, obviously represent our intuitions
regarding (l)? 35
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(4) What ( 1 ) expresses might have been the case.
...Now my claim is that our understanding of (4) conforms to the
theory of rigidity. No possible situation in which anyone but
Aristotle himself was fond of dogs can be relevant38
...of course it was part of my view...that this', T, you', etc., are





Kripke makes several theses clear in the passage just quoted. First, he
indicates that tokens of proper names, demonstratives and indexicals, as
they are used to express particular propositions, are all rigid designators. At
least, then, if such a term, t, denotes an object, x, then with respect to every
possible situation in which x exists, t denotes x. (Issues that arise when the
object fails to exist will not concern us in this essay.) Correlatively, he also
holds the thesis that propositions expressible using such terms are true only
in those possible situations in which the denoted object exists. 1 assume that
even in a possible situation where there exist two objects that possess
exactly the same contingent purely qualitative properties38
, it is only the
object rigidly denoted that matters to the truth of the proposition. (Kripke
clearly also assumes that it is possible, and quite easy and common, for
people to believe the propositions so expressible.) Kripke thus presents a
powerful appeal to intuition: the modal intuition that there are some
individual propositions which we typically express using proper names,
indexicals or demonstratives. The proposition expressed by his use of (1) is
thus aptly represented by the ordered pair [Aristotle, being fond of dogs], (It
seems that Plato might have expressed the very same proposition by
demonstrating Aristotle, and saying, "that man is fond of dogs ', or, you are
fond of dogs”; and Aristotle might have thought the same proposition by
thinking, "I am fond of dogs '.) The friends of the purely qualitative - and
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even their less extreme colleagues - seem to give the wrong truth conditions
for the propositions expressed by such sentence uses. They hold that the
relevant propositions are true in some situations in which Aristotle does not
exist, and in which instead someone qualitatively similar has the properties
attributed to Aristotle. The similarlity needn't even be very great. If, for
example, the proposition expressed by Kripke's ( 1 ) were really the purely
qualitative proposition that the greatest philosopher of antiquity was fond of
dogs, then the proposition that Aristotle was fond of does would be true in
any possible situation in which there was any dog-lover who was in that
situation the one and only philosopher of antiquity greater than all others of
the era. And this might be true even if in such a situation, the philosopher
was a 20th century advertising executive, or a Phonecian grape leaf
merchant, otherwise wholly dissimilar from the actual Aristotle. This result
is, at the very least, wildly counterintuitive. Kripke is surely right in
maintaining that we have modal intuitions to the contrary.
Perry's Messy Shopper and Lewis Two Gods
Kripke's modal objection focusses on a modal property of propositions:
being possibly true. Some philosophers have offered another sort of
objection against the claim that proper names, demonstratives and indexicals
express purely qualitative properties, and that the propositions they are
used to express are purely qualitative. They focus on doxastic and epistemic
properties of propositions: being possibly believed, and being possibly
known (or learned). kripke himself offers arguments that can be interpreted
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in this way. For example, the proposition expressed by his use of ( 1 ) - the
proposition that Aristotle was fond of dogs - is one that can be believed by
someone who does not believe the proposition that the greatest philosopher
of antiquity was fond of dogs . An admirer of Stoicism might believe that the
object so characterized is a canine-hating Stoic, instead. The general claim is
that for any proposition expressible using a proper name, demonstrative or
indexical, the proposition can be believed without the believer s thereby
believing any purely qualitative proposition: as in the preceding, one might
believe that Aristotle was fond of dogs without believing that the greatest
philosopher of antiquity was fond of dogs because one failed to believe that
Aristotle was the greatest philosopher of antiquity . Ultimately, the general
claim is based on an appeal to what might be called doxastic intuition, but
the recent literature contains some especially vivid examples meant to excite
and fortify those intuitions. Two of the clearest examples are given by John
Perry and by David Lewis, and concern beliefs expressible using indexicals.
Here is Perry's example:
1 once followed a trail of sugar on the supermarket floor,
pushing my cart down the aisle on one side of a tall counter and
back the aisle on the other, seeking the shopper with the torn
sack to tell him he was making a mess. With each trip around
the counter, the trail became thicker. But I seemed unable to
catch up. Finally it dawned on me. 1 was the shopper I was
trying to catch.
I believed at the outset that the shopper with a torn sack was
making a mess. And I was right. But 1 didn't believe that I was
making a mess. That seems to be something that I came to
believe. And when I came to believe that, I stopped following
the trail around the counter, and rearranged the torn sack in
my cart. My change in beliefs seems to explain my change in
behavior 39 .
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Suppose that Perry announces his discovery by saying "I am making a mess’
',
and that he thereby expresses a proposition which we may call "Perry's
discovery ”. Is Perry's discovery a proposition expressible by a sentence of
the form "the F is making a mess", where "the F" expresses a purely
qualitative property? Perry thinks not.
...First, even if I was thinking of myself as, say, the only
bearded philosopher in a Safeway store west of the Mississippi,
the fact that I came to believe that the only such philosopher
was making a mess explains my action only on the assumption
that I believed that I was the only such philosopher, which
brings in the indexical again. Second, in order to provide me
with an appropriate proposition as the object of belief, ... (the
individual concept) will have to fit me. Suppose I was thinking
of myself in the way described, but that I wasn't bearded and
wasn't in a Safeway store - I had forgotten that I had shaved
and gone to the A&P instead. Then the proposition supplied by
this strategy would be false, while what I came to believe, that
I was making a mess, was true«°.
(In order to make this example directly relevant here, we should suppose
that the names "Safeway" and "Mississippi" are eliminable in favor of terms
that express only purely qualitative properties.)
Perry also gives examples that involve temporal indexicals.
...a professor...desires to attend the department meeting on time,
and believes correctly that it begins at noon, (but) sits
motionless in his office at that time. Suddenly he begins to
move. What explains his action? A change in belief. He
believed all along that the department meeting starts at noon;
he came to believe, as he would have put it, that it starts now^ 1 .
Generalizing on these and other examples that he gives, Perry concludes,
This strategy assumes that whenever I have a belief I would
characterize by using a sentence with an indexical d,
I believe that...d...
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that there is some ...(purely qualitative property c) such that it
is also true that,
I believe that d is c
and that, on this second point, lam right. But there is no reason
to believe that this would always be so«2.
David Lewis presents one of the best and most ambitious examples intended
to help us recognize the incorrectness of the friends of the purely qualitative.
(It is also intended by Lewis to help us recognize the incorrectness of the
doctrine of propositions, but more of that in Chapter II.) "Consider the case of
the two gods," Lewis asks:
The gods inhabit a world W; there is another world V, which is
qualitatively just like W but which differs in that the gods have
traded places. The god on the tallest mountain in W and the
god on the coldest mountain in V...are united by a primitive
bond that makes them one. (Likewise for the god on the coldest
mountain in W and the god on the tallest mountain in V.) If
the god on the tallest mountain in W does not know whether he
is on the tallest or the coldest mountain, he must not really
know quite which world is his. He may know everything
qualitative that there is to know about his world, but not know
whether his world is W or V. If he knew that, he would know
every proposition that holds at his world. But it seems there is
one he doesn t know: the proposition he would express if he
said, in English, T am on the tallest mountain." If his pronoun
"I" applies both to him and his brother in Haecceity on the
coldest mountain in V, then indeed this proposition holds at W
but not at V. If he knew this proposition, would he not know
that he is on the tallest mountain?^
(Somewhat ironically, Lewis' own answer to this question is "No", but
he provides eloquent expression of responsible opposing viewpoints.) If it
does not strain intuition too much, we may suppose even the small
qualitative differences present in Lewis' example to be absent from another
example, in which, however, there is still a difference between the
18
propositions expressed by one god's use of "I exist" and the other god's use
of I exist' they still differ in their constituents (the gods themselves) and
their possible world truth conditions. If even Lewis example fails to bolster
the appropriate intuitions, then the following case might aid the transition
from supermarket to mountaintop. The Nestor twins are neurosurgeons of
the 25th century, when all such surgery is done with the use of TV monitors
and remotely controlled, computer-aided surgical instruments. The Nestors
have been raised in carefully controlled environments from birth, and have
had qualitatively similar experiences, mental and physical. Each develops a
cerebral aneurysm (in the same place, of course) and chooses to have the
other perform the needed surgery. As is the common 25th century
neurosurgical practice, the neurosurgeons' brains are wired directly into the
computer (-luckily, the aneurysm is placed so it does not interfere). Neither
Nestor notices how he is situated in the operating room, and they have the
same view, through the same video-camera eye, of each of their partially
sedated bodies. Because the procedures are replicas, there is no reason for
the computer to burden the surgeons with concerns about which is
controlling which set of remotely -controlled instruments; each could be
operating on himself, for all he knows. Each monitors the brain states of
both patients, and finds them exactly similar throughout the operation. (Had
they bothered, they would have found such similarity throughout their lives,
and would find such similarity for the remainder of their lives.) They
simultaneously think, T il survive, and so will he." These surgeons are
subsequently rewarded for their humanitarian work by Zeus, who
transforms them into minor deities, one of whom lives on the coldest
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mountain, the other on the tallest.... The transformation is gradual, so that it
does not disturb their psyches; omniscience does not come all at once. First
they are given complete qualitative knowledge, and then later knowledge of
all of the many remaining individual propositions. Of course they knew
some different individual propositions even during their surgery, when they
contemplated their continued survival.
I know of no more powerful appeals to the relevant doxastic and
epistemic intuitions than those made by the examples of Perry and Lewis. I
propose to accept the generalizations plausibly prompted by their examples,
and accepted by them and by Kripke: that propositions typically expressed
by uses of proper names, indexicals or demonstratives are not purely
qualitative. If what is thereby believed is analyzable propositionally, then
those propositions are instead individual propositions with the denoted
objects as constituents; propositions true only in those situations in which
those very objects exist and have the attributed properties. The fate of the
doctrine of propositions thus seems to depend on this role for individual
propositions. As Perry, Lewis and Kripke also argue, there is good reason to
believe that the fate is rather gloomy. In the remainder of this essay, I join
them in spreading the gloom. I will restrict my detailed attention to
demonstrative beliefs typically expressible by "this'' or that", and indexical
beliefs typically expressible by "I". While many of the same points can be
made about temporally indexical beliefs, making them would introduce
unhelpful complexity; one inextricable tangle at a time , as Russell might say.
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CHAPTER II
GETTING RID OF INDIVIDUAL PROPOSITIONS?
In Chapter I, I discussed several arguments against the view that
belief is simply a two-place relation between a believer and a purely
qualitative proposition. I suggested that in order to maintain the view that
belief is a two-place relation between a believer and a proposition, one
might hold that at least in the case of beliefs expressed by indexicals,
demonstratives or proper names, the believer is dyadically related to an
individual proposition. In this chapter, I examine two examples which raise
serious doubts about the latter claim. The first example that I'll consider is
an augmented version of Perry’s Messy Shopper; the second presents a
puzzle about demonstrative belief.
The Augmented Messv Shopper
Let's begin by recalling Perry s initial description of the case of the
messy shopper:
I once followed a trail of sugar on the supermarket floor,
pushing my cart down the aisle on one side of a tall counter and
back the aisle on the other, seeking the shopper with the torn
sugar sack to tell him that he was making a mess. With each
trip around the counter, the trail became thicker. But I seemed
unable to catch up. Finally it dawned on me. I was the shopper
I was trying to catch 1 .
About this case, Perry remarks:
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I believed at the outset that the shopper with the torn sack was
making a mess. And I was right. But I didn t believe that I was
making a mess. That seems to be something that I came to
believe. And when I came to believe that. I stopped following
the trail around the counter, and rearranged the torn sack in
my cart. My change in beliefs seems to explain my change in
behavior 2 .
As discussed in Chapter I, this example and these remarks form the core of
Perry's argument against the claim that indexicai beliefs consist in a two-
place relation between the believer and a purely qualitative proposition. But
Perry does not stop there. He augments his example in an attempt to show
that indexicai beliefs do not consist in a two-place relation between the
believer and an individual proposition, either. Here s what he adds:
Suppose that there were mirrors at either end of the counter so
that as 1 pushed the cart down the aisle in pursuit I saw myself
in the mirror. I take what I see to be a reflection of the messy
shopper going up the aisle on the other side, not realizing that
what I am really seeing is a reflection of a reflection of myself. I
point and say, truly, "I believe that he is making a mess "3.
Let s again call what Perry came to believe, a belief that he might have
expressed by saying, "I am making a mess", "Perry's discovery '. Imagine that
after he makes his discovery, Perry returns to the aisle with the double
mirrors and pointing at himself in the mirror, makes these additional
remarks:
When I pushed the cart down the aisle in pursuit, I believed
that he was making a mess. And I was right. But I didn t
believe that I was making a mess. That seems to be something
that 1 came to believe. And when I came to believe that, I
stopped pushing my cart down the aisle, and rearranged the
torn sack in my cart. My change in beliefs seems to explain my
change in behavior.
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We thus seem to be able to establish that
U) Perry's discovery the individual proposition Perry
expresses by "he is making a mess".
The individual proposition mentioned in ( 1 ) may be represented by the
ordered pair of Perry and the property of being a mess- maker. The
difference recorded in ( 1 ) is made vivid in Perry's example because Perry's
discovery has the property of being such that Perry's believing it motivates
him to clean up, but the individual proposition mentioned in (1) lacks that
property! Perry thinks that we would be hard-pressed to explain this
change in behavior unless there were different elements mentioned in ( 1
)
which had different motivational properties in the example. We thus seem
to have a counterexample to the claim that what the instances of the schema
T am F“ express on each occasion of their use are individual propositions
consisting of the referent of the use of T and the property expressed by the
use of "is F". For if ( 1 ) is true, then what Perry expresses by saying T am
making a mess" is not the individual proposition consisting of Perry and the
property of being a mess maker.
I do not think that Perry's counterexample is compelling. There is a
natural and not wholly implausible response that an advocate of individual
propositions could make: while Perry's discovery is different from what he
expresses by saying "he is making a mess", what is expressed by these words
in these circumstances could not be the individual proposition consisting of
Perry and the property of being a mess-maker; the latter is what Perry later
discovers, when he is willing to assert, T am making a mess". Instead,
Perry's use of "he is making a mess expresses what could more
perspicuously be expressed by his saying
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(2) the person I now seem to see over there is making a mess.
(2) expresses an individual proposition, the one consisting of Perry and the
property he could express by "now seeming to see just one mess-maker over
there 5. But what (2) expresses is a different individual proposition than the
one consisting of Perry and the property of being a mess maker. The latter
is Perry's discovery, and is discovered only after he learns the additional
individual proposition he could express by
(3) I am the person I now seem to see over there.
Perry makes his discovery by inferring it from what (2) and (3) express.
From the point of view of the advocate of individual propositions, Perry’s
example leaves room for an additional definite description ("the person 1
now seem to see over there"), and that is room enough to maneuver for a
saving delay in his learning the individual proposition consisting of Perry
and the property of being a mess- maker.
I think that this response to Perry exemplifies the best sort of
response that is open to the advocate of individual propositions. It also
opens the door to some embarrassing questions. Part of the response was
the claim that what Perry expressed by "he is making a mess" could not be
the individual proposition consisting of Perry and the property of being a
mess maker. But what is it about the circumstances of Perry's assertion that
necessarily prevents Perry from believing that individual proposition then?
Are there some stringent necessary conditions for the apprehension of
individual propositions that Perry fails to meet? If so, what are they?
Presumably, Perry can in some circumstances express the individual
proposition consisting of Perry and the property of being a mess maker by
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asserting he is making a mess'* What is it about the mirror case that
prevents his doing that there? Anyone who wishes to claim that coming to
believe an individual proposition is trickier than Perry seems to think owes
us an answer to these questions. What would be most desirable is a clear
statement of necessary and sufficient conditions under which a believer
apprehends a given individual proposition.
I said that these questions are embarrassing. The embarrassment
would not be terribly significant if all they did was to bring our attention to
a gap in the view of the advocate of individual propositions. Gaps can
sometimes be filled satisfactorily. In this case, however, I will argue that the
gap cannot be filled satisfactorily. To help show this, I next present a puzzle
about demonstrative belief and belief expressed using proper names7 . I will
return to indexical belief in the last part of this chapter.
The Two Tubes Case
Smith is the subject of a psychological experiment designed to test his
ability to focus his eyes independently of one another. He is a medical
student, and he has developed this ability to perfection, having spent
hundreds of hours working at the microscope, one eye on the objective, the
other on the paper where he draws what he sees. The experimental
apparatus consists of a large, opaque screen with two small eye holes in it.
Two tubes lead from the eye holes and can be oriented in a large number of
directions to point at a uniformly red, uniformly illuminated sheet of plastic
in front of the screen. Smith is to look through the tubes simultaneously and
to report what he sees as he focusses his eyes independently. He is familiar
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with the apparatus and knows that he does not know how the tubes are
oriented when he looks through them. At noon on the day of the
experiment, Smith steps up to the screen and looks through the tubes
simultaneously, taking no notice of how his eyes are in fact oriented, and
focussing his eyes independently. What he sees through his right eye is a
circular red spot, which he dubs this
;
what he sees through his left eye is a
precisely similar circular red spot, which he dubs "that"8 . He thinks to
himself
(4) this is red and that is red
A somewhat pedantic and cautious person, he also thinks to himself
(5) this = this and that = that
an expression in part of his belief that what he is seeing exists. Smith does
not know how the tubes are oriented and knows that he is ignorant, so he
wonders, Is this = that?". When I say that he wonders in this way, I mean
to be stipulating in part that he neither believes nor disbelieves what he
would express by "this = that" or by "this 4 that". He is, however, confident of
the truth of the beliefs he expresses by (4) and (5). Even though the sadistic
supervising psychologist has threatened Smith with a fatal electric shock if
he (Smith) attempts to report beliefs about how things merely appear to him
to be, rather than about how they are, Smith remains confident in his beliefs,
a wholly rational attitude, given the optimum perceptual circumstances in
which Smith knows himself to be. Let us then stipulate in addition that (4)
and (5) not only express beliefs of Smith's, but also express propositions that
he knows that he knows. To summarize, let us imagine that Smith's interior
monologue goes like this:
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I know that I know that this is red and that this - this and that
that is red and that that = that, and I know that I do not believe
that this = that or that this^that, and I know that I do not
disbelieve that this = that or that this^that.
And about all of this, Smith is entirely correct; his interior monologue
expresses nothing but truths.
Finally, suppose that the tubes are in fact pointed at the very same
red spot.
I claimed above that this example would cause trouble for an advocate
of individual propositions. I'll now explain how it causes trouble. First, I
assume that
(A) It is possible that a believer believe an individual
proposition with a contingent thing other than himself as a
constituent.
Second, I think that is clear from the example that Smith is in optimum
circumstances for believing and knowing an individual proposition. He is,
after all, looking straight at the red spot, his eyes are in perfect condition,
the lighting is excellent, and Smith is an intelligent and reflective person who
knows that he is in optimum perceptual circumstances. No one is ever in a
better position to believe or know such an individual proposition. So I also
assume that
(B) If (A) is true, then Smith believes the individual proposition
he expresses by "this = this" and the individual proposition he
expresses by "that = that".
Which individual propositions are expressed by "this = this" and by "that =
that", as Smith uses them? They both express the same individual
proposition, representable as the ordered set consisting of the spot he sees,
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the identity relation, and the spot he sees. If we use "0" for the spot, and
for the identity relation, we may represent these facts as follows:
(6) the proposition that Smith expresses by "this = this"= [0 ,=,0]
(7) the proposition that Smith expresses by "that = that"= [0,=,0]
It is also true that this = that as Smith uses it expresses the same
individual proposition:
(8) the proposition that Smith expresses by "this = that"= 10,=,0]
We therefore have the result that:
(C) If Smith believes the individual proposition he expresses by
this = this" and the individual proposition he expresses by "that
= that
,
then he believes the individual proposition he expresses
by "this = that”.
((C) would still express a truth if the "and" were replaced by an "or", in itself
an odd result.) But Smith s interior monologue makes it equally clear that
(D) It is not the case that Smith believes the individual
proposition he expresses by "this = that".
After all, Smith wonders, "Is this = that?". So it seems that (D) must be true
if Smith s ignorance is to be accounted for9 . The trouble for the advocate of
individual propositions is that, on her view, all of (A), (B), (C) and (D) are
true. But they are also inconsistent, and so can t ail be true.
Before returning to discussion of Perry's Augmented Messy Shopper
and indexical belief, I want to mention one rather popular possible line of
response to the Two Tubes case. (It has often been the first response that I
have encountered after presenting the case.) One might try to save
individual propositions by using a metalinguistic strategy: Smith does not
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believe the individual propositions expressed using the demonstratives ' this”
and "that”, but instead believes the metalinguistic propositions
(9) "this is red and that is red” expresses a true individual
proposition
(10) this = this and that = that” expresses a true individual
proposition
and that he wonders metaiinguistically whether "this = that" expresses a true
individual proposition. In the absence of considerable further detail, it is not
possible to refute this suggestion.
It is, however, worth indicating, in a preliminary way, the sort of
reply that this kind of response deserves. First, although we may suppose
that Smith has the metalinguistic beliefs he could express by (9) and (10), it
is clear from the example (1 would claim) that he also believes the
propositions expressed by the sentences mentioned in (9) and (10). Second,
even if we were to grant that the metalinguistic response works in the case
as described, we can add a bit to the example to disable this kind of
response. (I think that this second reply amounts to a clarification of the
first. It doesn t much matter how we count the replies.) Assume that it is
possible for a believer to refer to and demonstrate the propositions that he
or she believes 10 . Let us then stipulate that Smith knows that he knows the
following metalinguistic facts (to state them as he would):
(11) this is what I dub "this"
(12) that is what 1 dub "that"
(13) "this = this" expresses the proposition that this = this
(14) "that = that" expresses the proposition that that = that
(13) "this = that" expresses the proposition that this = that
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Surely, if anyone can ever know such metalinguistic facts about his current
use of demonstratives and the propositions he uses them to express, Smith
does. Not only are his perceptual circumstances optimum, as recorded in (B),
above, but so are his metalinguistic circumstances'. (This is a metalinguistic
version of (B), above.) If we allow, in addition, that Smith can demonstrate
these individual propositions (perhaps by an appropriate focussing of his
mind s eye), then, I would suggest, the problems raised by the Two Tubes
case are merely deferred, and not solved. Suppose that Smith says
(16) this proposition is expressed by "this = this"
(17) that proposition is expressed by "that = that"
and then wonders "Is this proposition = that proposition?". The original
problems would recur in semantic ascent. (This kind of reply would also
seem to render implausible a suggestion made by Heidelberger 1
1
which,
when applied to this case, would have it that although Smith asserts the
individual propositions involved, he does not believe them. Clearly, he does
both.)
I have described the Two Tubes case as an example of demonstrative
belief, but it can easily be redescribed as an example of beliefs expressed
using proper names. Simply suppose that Smith dubs what he sees through
his right eye by "Harold" and dubs what he sees through his left eye by
"Maude". Then substitute "Harold" for "this" and "Maude" for "that"
throughout the original description.
The Two Tubes case is designed to satisfy the strictest plausible
necessary and sufficient conditions for someone s believing an individual
proposition with a contingent thing other than the believer as a constituent;
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that is, it is designed to make (B) true. But if it succeeds in doing this, then
the failure of an advocate of individual propositions to give such conditions
is, as I claimed above, a gap that cannot be filled satisfactorily. We would
then be justified in concluding that the reply I offered to Perry's Augmented
Messy Shopper on behalf of the advocate of individual propositions, although
of the best sort, is not one that succeeds.
The Examples Made Parallel
In order to make clear the parallel between the problems presented
by these two cases, Perry's and the Two Tubes, I will lay out Perry's in the
same fashion as the Two Tubes case was in the last section.
Perry s example depends in part for its force on an assumption that it
is possible for a believer to learn some individual propositions with the
believer as a constituent in much the same way as one learns individual
propositions about others. I will put this assumption rather conservatively
as follows:
( A ) It is possible that a believer believe an individual
proposition with the believer as a constituent, where the
proposition is not expressed by the believer in a sentence of the
form, "I am F" (-or a synonymous expression).
It seems that one way we could learn individual propositions with others as
constituents is by seeing others. In Perry's example, he not only seems to
see himself, he also sees himself in the mirror and comes thereby to have
the beliefs described in his example. Because of some contingent facts about
human eyes, Perry s seeing himself as he does requires a device that changes
the path of the illuminating light rays, but it is hard to see how the
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contingent need to use such a device (e.g., mirrors or lenses) could reduce
the effectiveness of the example. Even this feature of the example could be
eliminated if we were to indulge in a bit of science fiction and suppose that
the believer in the example has his eye on long stalks, so he can use his eyes
to view himself more directly 12. So as in the Two Tubes case, the believer
seems to be in optimum conditions for learning the relevant individual
proposition:
(B ) If 1 A ) is true, then Perry believes the individual
proposition he expresses by "he is making a mess'"
Since the individual proposition Perry expresses by "he is making a mess"
just is the individual proposition expressed by his use of "I am making a
mess", we have:
(C) If Perry believes the individual proposition he expresses
by he is making a mess", then Perry believes the individual
proposition he expresses by "I am making a mess".
That is, when Perry sees himself in the mirror, he has thereby made Perrys
discovery. But it is equally clear from the example that when he first sees
himself in the mirror
(D ) Perry does not believe the individual proposition he
expresses by "I am making a mess".
Again, it would seem that (D ) must be held to be true by the advocate
of individual propositions if an account is to be given of why Perry then fails
to stop pushing his cart down the aisle and to straighten up his sugar sack.
But not all of (A ), (B ), (C) and (D ) can be true, since they are inconsistent.
To make the parallel between the two examples closer still, we might
have Perry consider the propositions he’d express by "I = I ", "he = he and I
= he" (or grammatical variants thereof). According to the advocate of
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individual propositions, the same proposition is expressed thrice over. But
that s wrong in such an example. Again, a strategy of semantic ascent would
be no help, for reasons precisely parallel to those discussed in the last
section.
Have We Gotten Rid of Individual Propositions?
Let's take a brief look at how things stand now. In the first chapter,
we took a close look at several arguments and examples to show that not
every belief consists in a two-term relation between a believer and a purely
qualitative proposition. Perhaps no knock-down proof was given, but the
arguments and examples were very persuasive. As a way of saving the view
that belief is nevertheless a two-term relation between believers and
propositions, it was suggested that some beliefs, those typically expressed
using indexicals, demonstratives or proper names, are relations to individual
propositions 13 . In this chapter, two examples were developed to help show
that individual propositions won't do, either. If propositions must be either
qualitative or individual, the considerations of this chapter would then
suggest that belief is not a two-term relation between a person and a
proposition; this traditional view would have to be given up.
There are, however, a few diehards who attempt to avoid the latter
result by rejecting either (A) and (A ) or (B) and (B ). In the next chapter, I
discuss Schiffer's views on belief, primarily as he presents them in The
Basis of Reference", 1 ^ which entail a rejection of (A) and (A ). One major
problem for his views motivates consideration of Russell's views in Chapter
V of his Problems of Philosophy. "Knowledge by Acquaintance and
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Knowledge by Description another major problem motivates consideration
of the essence views of Plantinga^ and Ackerman 16 in Chapter IV here In
Chapter V, I present and criticize Stalnaker s views on belief as adumbrated
in his Indexical Belief
" 17
;
he gives us reasons for rejecting (B) and (B ).
Finally, in Chapter VI, I examine the most well worked out views that
reject the traditional view of belief: that it consists in a two-term relation
between a believer and a proposition. These views are of two sorts: self-
attributive and triadic. I examine what I take to be the best of each sort:
Chisholm 18 and Lewis 1 ? agree that belief consists in the self-attribution of
purely qualitative properties; Kaplan20 and Richard 21 agree that in addition
to (individual) propositions believed, there are ways of believing them.
Although Schiffer may differ from Chisholm and Lewis on a metaphysical
issue (Haecceitism), it turns out that their views are epistemologically
isomorphic" and so ail three are open to the criticisms of Chapter III. Kaplan's
view either fails to solve the problem presented by the Two Tubes case, or is
too vague to provide a solution. Richard s view is open to a criticism parallel
to that made of Stalnaker's view in Chapter V.
In the Postscript, I express my sympathy with the views of Stalnaker
and with the views of Richard: their allegedly counterintuitive consequences
may not, I think, be unacceptably counterintuitive. And I say what a better
view - one fully consonant with the intuitions of Chapter I - would have to
be like.
Schiffer is up next.
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CHAPTER III
IT’S JUST ME NOW: SCHIFFER ON BELIEF
In Chapter II, I argued that none of: demonstrative belief, indexical
belief or beliefs expressed using proper names consists in a two-term
relation between a believer and an individual proposition. In my argument, I
assumed that
(A) It is possible that a believer believe an individual
proposition with a contingent thing other than himself as a
constituent.
In this chapter, I discuss the views of Stephen Schiffer, who denies (A). I
concentrate on his presentation in "The Basis of Reference”!. For those who
are impatient about getting to the punch line, here is one way Schiffer
describes the relevant part of his view:
"I" and "now" are the only logically proper names that we need
to recognize, and ... eschewing, as we should, Russell's
foundationalism, we need not recognize irreducibly de re
knowledge of sense data or bodily sensations 2 .
How, then, do other singular terms function, on Schiffer's view? The story
that leads up to the punch line answers that question, and I turn to it in the
next section. In the following sections of this chapter, I present criticisms of
Schiffer's view and argue that he would do well to move closer to Russell's




Schitfer begins by claiming that at least part ol the meaning of
believes is to be functionally specified:
...to say that a person believes such and such is to say that he is
in a state which is related in certain ways to sensory input, to
behavioral output, and to other mental states. Of special
concern to us will be what we might call the internal functional
role of a mental state - namely, the relations of that state, actual
and counterfactual, to other mental states!
The relations in question are those that must be met by the beliefs of any
minimally rational person '5. Schiffer does not give a complete list of these,
but he does give three clear examples of such relations: if S is a minimally
rational person, then at any given time,
(i) if S believes that p, then S does not believe that not-p;
(ii) if S believes that p and S believes that q, then S believes
that p and q;
(iii) if S believes that p and S believes that q and S desires that
q and S believes that if p, then q only if r; then, ceteris paribus.
S desires that r
for any propositions, p, q and r! (i) is a central premise in Schiffer s
argument for the part of his view of interest here7 . It is not far from (i) to
the denial of (A), above. Given that (i) is part of the meaning of believes' (at
least as the term is applied to minimally rational' believers), we may
suppose that it is a necessary truth. Suppose that it is possible that, at a
given time, a believer, S, believe an individual proposition, [x,F], with some
contingent object, x^S, as a constituent. Then, Schiffer claims, it is possible
that at that time, S also believe that not-lx.F]. He supports his claim with
examples ol the same sort that we have already considered in the previous
two chapters.
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(The Two Tubes case can easily be modified to provide an especially
sharp example: suppose that Smith suffers a momentary defect of color
vision that makes the red spot he sees through his left eye appear green, and
that he is unaware of this defect; he will then believe the individual
propositions that he could express by "this is red and that is not red and this
^that". But then, at one time, he would believe that [0, redness] and he
would believe that not-lO,redness], in violation of Schiffer s constraints on
minimal rationality.)
Given these assumptions, it follows that no one can. at one time, ever
believe an individual proposition, p, and also then believe that not-p, if p has
a contingent thing other than the believer as a constituent.
All we can get from the preceding is a necessary condition for
believing an individual proposition: if S believes an individual proposition, p,
with contingent thing, x, as a constituent, then x - S. But there is more to
Schiffer s view than this, as already suggested in the punch line quoted at
the beginning of this chapter. Schiffer finds sufficient conditions for
believing an individual proposition by considering examples derived from
examples given by Perry and by Castaneda8 . Here s what he says:
If Ralph says, "I am handsome", then Ralph, if sincere, believes
himself to be handsome, and this self-ascriptive belief is
irreducibiy de re (i.e„ belief in an individual proposition Being
handsome, Ralph>). But if Ralph says, "He's an ugly fellow",
referring to a man in a photograph, who happens to be Ralph,
then ... this ... (is) a non-self -ascriptive belief (and) does not
differ in kind from the beliefs that Ralph has about any other
material object and ... is not irreducibiy de re q .
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Schiffer also alludes to a case of a sensorily deprived amnesiac (who) might
nevertheless know himself to be conscious" Generalizing on such examples,
Schiffer concludes
Not all beliefs that a person might have about himself are
irreducibly de re; only those which he can express with the
pronoun 1 , and which we might call self-ascriptive beliefs'
There is a similar class of examples for belief about time, as we saw in
Chapter I. Schiffer makes use of these to introduce what we might call
present-ascnptive beliefs ", on analogy with self-ascriptive beliefs.
Summarizing, Schiffer says
What applies to the thoughts expressible with I applies also,
mutfltis mutandis, to the thoughts expressible with now', and I
submit that the complete content of the thought Ralph
expresses at time t by his utterance of I am thirsty is given by
the singular proposition <x is thirsty at time y,<Raiph,t». What
this means, of course, is that there is a single, primitive belief
relation which has in its range both singular and general
propositions, and that the singular propositions to which a
person is thus related at a given time are only those containing
himself and that time, and these are the thoughts expressible
for that person by sentences containing T and now' 12 .
It may have occurred to the reader that similar reasoning might just
as well have been used to derive the result that, in the following sorts of
uses, both this and "here" are logically proper names : "1" expresses what
is expressed by the believer's use. in referring to a particular experience, of
"the person who is now having this experience"; "the red spot now appears to
me to be here ". where "here" is used to indicate apparent location in the
perceiver s visual field. Schiffer does no more than hint at why he does not
accept the former suggestion (in the passage quoted above to which footnote
2 is attached, in which he eschews "Russell's foundationalism"). I will discuss
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this suggestion no further here. In considering criticisms of Schiffer's views,
I will explain why he does not make here a logically proper name
;
and I
will raise an objection to Schiffer s failure to do so.
Since Schiffer denies that a believer can believe the individual
propositions that one might most plausibly suppose to be expressed using
names, demonstratives or indexicals other than "I" and "now'' (notably,
here ), he must hold that some other propositions are expressed using these
linguistic tools. He does. He advocates a description theory: singular terms
other than T and "now" express individual concepts, and the individual
concepts are expressible by definite descriptions that contain purely general
terms, except, perhaps for occurrences of "I" and "now". He allows that
different individual concepts may be expressed by different uses of a given
singular term; indeed, for many singular terms, this variability will be
typical 1 ^. In those cases where the belief so expressed is neither self-
ascriptive nor present-ascriptive, but is nevertheless of the sort that
philosophers typically call
"
de re ". Schiffer adds the requirement that the
believer know that the individual concept satisfied by the res is uniquely
instantiated. In what follows, I will proceed in a way that will make
clarification of this requirement .unnecessary.
This is a fairly full statement of Schiffer's view. I turn now to
criticism of his view. I consider first his own reply to what he takes to be
the most serious challenge to it.
Pav Attention!
Suppose that I am looking at a large collection of qualitatively
identical cups; we might even suppose, to strengthen the
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objection, that there is nothing but cups in my visual field Now
my attention might alight on one of them, and I might, so to say,
think to myself, That one is red’. In this event, the particular
cup that I have in mind will be believed by me to be red, but -
so the objection runs - I will have no identifying description for
it: it is not the only one I am looking at, nor can it be identified
via its spatial relation to myself, or to some object for which I
do have an identifying description 14 .
This is how Schiffer states what he takes to be the most serious challenge to
his view 1 5. Here is how he responds to this putatively best counterexample:
... there is a perfectly good reply: there is an individual concept
under which I believe the cup to be red; the cup is the only cup
to which I am now attending, and I know that whatever cup I
am now uniquely attending to is red. Nor is this reply ad hoc .
For suppose that one is looking at a tree with hundreds of
leaves. It would be absurd to suppose that one has a belief
about each particular leaf in one s visual field; to have a belief
about some particular leaf, it must be singled out for one in
some special way - if only by being the one one s gaze is fixed
on 16 .
It is instructive to look first at a misinterpretation of this reply, given by
Kent Bach in his De Re Belief and Methodological Solipsism 17 . Bach says
that, according to Schiffer,
... there must be some fallback description ... under which one
actually thinks of the object (not merely could think of the
object), which description specifies some way the object appears
to one at the time 18 .
As an example, Bach gives the description, "the only object which I am now
looking at which appears to me to be a cup". As an illustration of how
Schiffer s reply is supposed to work, this is a failure, for at least the
following three reasons. First, Schiffer explicitly distinguishes between
looking at something and attending to it, and it is the latter notion that he
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proposes for use in tough cases. Second, there needn't be anything in the
fallback description about how the object appears to the believer at the time;
indeed, in the case described, all the objects are stipulated to be qualitatively
indiscernible, by which Schiffer clearly means to indicate that they all
appear alike 19 . Even if the believer had no idea what a cup was, or had no
belief about what kind of crockery confronted him, "the object to which I am
now attending could serve as a fallback description'. This helps to explain
why here is not counted in with I and now as an essential indexical;
Schiffer could hold that what a use of here expresses is equally well
expressible by the believer using "the place to which I am now attending ".
Third, Schiffer does not say that descriptions about how things appear or
what the believer is attending to at a time are always to be used to indicate
which individual concept a demonstrative expresses in the context; rather,
they are to be used when all else has been ruled out, as in his example of the
many cups. With these additional clarifications in mind, we can now turn to
criticism of Schiffer s view. I begin with epistemological objections and turn
later to a modal objection, adapted from Chapter I.
Loaring the Boom
Loar presents an objection 20 to the sort of view that Schiffer holds.
(He even cites Schiffer s work for giving an "...illuminating defense... of
description theories 21 .) Loar writes
Often my only individuating conceptions of perceived objects
are of their being related uniquely to me, or to things I am
directly aware of....Moreover those conceptions often involve
psychological and not spatio-temporal relations. Thus suppose I
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attend to a quite unprepossessing star, randomly chosen; there
are no spatial relations, of which 1 have suitable information,
that relate it and no other star to me. One description that
involves a psychological relation might be this; 'the star I am
attending to . That does not yield a persuasive description
theory: for what makes it true of an object that I am attending
t0 it? A, description account requires vet a further psychological
relation, in a new description- while any other account prompts
an unanswerable reply: if attending to an object doesn't have to
be via some description of it, why does belief about it have to
be so? (Second set of italics mine.)
Loar's objection seems misguided. Let us agree, with Schiffer, that there is a
difference between the act of attending to a particular object and the act of
looking at it ( singling it out for attention '). Let us also agree that there must
be some psychological relationship, other than attending, (call it "R") that the
believer bears to that particular object and which he bears to no other object
at the same time. Suppose in addition that if the believer were to consider
the proposition he could express by
( 1 ) the object to which I now bear R is red,
he would believe, or even know, it. It does not follow that believer believes
the proposition he could express by ( 1 ); that is something that he could
discover later, or that he might never find out. If, by "requires'' in the above
quotation, Loar means to indicate that a necessary condition of a believer s
attending to an object is that he bear uniquely some other psychological
relationship to the object, then Schiffer can admit this plausible requirement
with equanimity. If, on the other hand, Loar means to say that the believer
must also believe that he bears that relationship to one and only one thing,
then Schiffer may simply reject the requirement. He may point out that
while the ability to attend to a particular object at a time requires that one
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in lact then bear many relations, psychological and otherwise, to it and it
alone, one need not have any beliefs about these additional relational facts.
If this reply defuses Loar s objection, it also opens Schiffer to another
objection based on the reply. The believer in the many cups example, call
him Stephen
", thinking about a particular cup, says to himself,
(2)
that one is red.
It may be granted that in order to have that belief about the particular cup,
Stephen must then attend to it. It may also be granted that if he were to
consider it, he would come to know the proposition he could express by
(3)
the object to which I am now attending is red.
But it does not follow that, in the case as Schiffer describes it, Stephen
already believes what he could express by (3), or that "that ", as he uses it in
(2), expresses the individual concept he could express by "the object to
which I am now attending . Both of these conclusions are false. Suppose
that Stephen introspects and finds that, as he would put it,
(4) there is one and only one object to which I am now
attending
He can nevertheless make the additional discovery that, at that time, as he
would put it
(5) that is the object to which I am now attending.
(Perhaps introspection is a kind of attending. If so, I suppose that it is
perceptual attending that is involved in the aforementioned propositions;
and that it is possible to attend perceptually to an external object while
attending intros pectively to one s thoughts.) To identify the two propositions
Stephen could express by (4) and (3), would be to make the same mistake as
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identifying the two propositions that Smith, of the Two Tubes example, could
express by there is one and only one object which I now dub 'this'", and
this is the object that I now dub ’this".
Schiffer does not see this as a mistake. He writes
If the description theory if right, then there ought always be
some description 0f such that one cannot wonder Is this) the fb?'
For, if the description theorist is right, the thought thus
expressed about the referent of this must be under some
individual concept, and, with respect to that description, the
Question means Is the J2( the ^(?'...what the description theory
predicts is what we do appear to find. ...it is clear that, with
respect to the cup' example with which we began, it does make
no sense for me to wonder Is this cup the cup that I am now
looking directly at?' 22 .
(For looking directly at" we may substitute "attending to".) But his reasons
for this conclusion seem to be defective in just the same way as Loar s
objection. It may be true that if Stephen were to attempt to wonder "Is that
the object to which I am now attending?", his ignorance would vanish. But
this does not entail that he could not be ignorant in this way; nor has it been
established that that", as Stephen uses it, expresses what "the object to
which I am now attending" expresses as he would use it.
Because 1 doubt that Schiffer would be persuaded by any of the
preceding, I want to turn next to a more nearly 'internal' criticism of his
view. There are cases in which the only available fallback descriptions will
involve spatial relations, and in these cases, the role of spatial location
indexicals deserves close scrutiny; such indexicals may well be essential.
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Being There
Although there are some tough cases in which the notion of attending
may yield a suitable individual concept, Schiffer must grant that there are
others in which it will not yield one because the believer attends
simultaneously to more than one object. Suppose, for example, that Stephen
decides to count the many cups he sees, and begins by attending to two of
them, noting that they are distinct, and concludes that he is seeing at least
two cups. So he might say to himself, that one this one ", attending
simultaneously to each, just to make sure that he really does see at least two
then. If Schiffer denies that it is possible to attend simultaneously to two
objects, then he divorces the term attending from any ordinary sense it
has, and makes its use either ad hoc or primitive. Introduction of such a
primitive for philosophical purposes would surely require substantial
justification, plausible apart from the special needs of Schiffer s theory of
beliel. I will assume for the purposes of the present discussion that
simultaneous attending is possible23 . And if an appeal to authority would be
helpful, here are some words from the person who may be the best
philosophical authority on the matter, Bertrand Russell:
We spoke earlier as if attention always has one object, but this
appears not to be the case. When we perceive our T as an
unanalyzed whole, it is one object of attention; but if another T
is placed alongside it, we shall naturally say that we see "two
T's". In this case, there seem to be two simultaneous objects of
attention 24 .
Let us then consider a tough case in which the notion of attending is not
useful in the way it was in the many cups case. One such case may be
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obtained Irom the many cups case simply by deleting from it the stipulation
that prompted the use of attending, namely, the stipulation that the object in
question cannot be identified via its spatial relations. It will also simplify
matters a bit if we suppose that, unlike cups, the objects seen lack a
conventional orientation; circular shapes will do. In order to make the case
as tough as possible, we should also rule out any identification of the objects
via spatial relations to the believer or other familiar points of reference. So
let us suppose that the believer is an astronaut in zero-gravity conditions
confronted with a wall full of Sudafed, small, red pills which in the available
lighting all appear to him to be exactly the same shade of red and to be
exactly the same circular shape and diameter. (Because of irregularities in
the manufacturing process, they are shaped a bit differently, and,
coincidentally, the irregularities are such that they all appear circular from
the astronaut s perspective. He is ignorant of their actual shapes.) The
astronaut also believes that he might be suffering from a neurological
condition called "allesthesia
,
in which sensations from one side of the body
seem to come from the opposite side of the body 2 5. So he'll not use
whatever concepts he would express by my right" and my left" in
identifying objects, and the zero-gravity conditions deprive him of one
common way of discerning up and down - directions. Arnold, the
pharmacist-astronaut, is still able to have beliefs about particular pills, to
count them (e.g., in taking inventory), and is able to attend to at least two of
them simultaneously. But the only way he will have of identifying them is
by where they appear to him to be in his current visual field. Imagine, then,
that he then believes what he could express by
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( 1 ) that one is red
(2) this one is red
(3) that one this one
while attending simultaneously to two pills, "this" and "that", as Arnold uses
them, must, on Schiffer's view, express individual concepts of the two pills.
Given the stipulations in the example, they are most plausibly held to
express, respectively, what Arnold could equally well express by "the object
that now appears to me to be there", and the object that now appears to me
to be here", where there and "here are what Arnold would use in speaking
of where the pills appeared to him to be. Let us also suppose that he attends
simultaneously to these locations in his visual field 26 . Unless, contrary to his
stated position, Schiffer is to admit spatial indexicals as essential indexicals,
here and there must themselves express individual concepts expressible
by Arnold using only "I", "now and purely qualitative terms that describe
how things appear to him to be at the time of his beliefs ( 1 ), (2) and (3)27.
Before considering how this might be done, I want to explain why an
apparently simpler approach to criticizing Schiffer will not work here. This
will also help to make clearer the constraints under which Schiffer must
operate if he is to give an account of Arnold's beliefs that is consonant with
his views.
Imagine a believer who inhabits a symmetrical possible world, and
who stands at an axis of symmetry, looking at two qualitatively indiscernible
objects located on either side of that axis. He thinks to himself, "that one is
different from this one", thus stating a piece of his knowledge. But the only
way he has of distinguishing between them is their diverse spatial locations:
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the one over there now", and "the one over here now", as he might put it.
By hypothesis, however, "being there" and "being here" must express non-
qualitative properties of the objects. And so, in this possible situation, "here"
and there are essential indexicals, contrary to what Schiffer holds.
Whether or not Schiffer agrees that the situation described is possible - and
there is nothing in his papers to indicate his position on the metaphysical
issue - he needn't be troubled by this example. He may reply that even in
such a situation, if it is possible, there are still purely qualitative properties
(save for occurrences in them of the believer and the time of his belief) that
this and "that express: the object that now appears to me to be there and
the object that now appears to me to be here" express them, too, as they
would be used by the believer. These descriptions might be used to correctly
describe objects other than the objects seen; indeed, such descriptions would
serve perfectly well in a case in which the believer were hallucinating the
whole scene, for they are purely phenomenal 28 . This response parallels the
one that Schiffer should give to the Two Tubes case. There, the appropriate
definite descriptions for Smith s beliefs are "the object that now appears to
me to be on the right and "the object that now appears to me to be on the
left". In that case, there is surely some fact about how Smith is appeared to
which would be accurately described by this pair of descriptions. Otherwise.
Smith could not wonder as he does. (Of course, I would still maintain that
his uses of demonstratives do not express what he could express by these
definite descriptions; see the previous section of this chapter.) It is clear,
therefore, that appearance-descriptions will be essential to the defense of
Schiffer s view in tough cases where the notion of attending cannot come to
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the rescue. Let us return then to Arnold the astronaut. In the course of our
further considerations, we will, inter alia, address the use of the descriptions
Schiffer would seek to impose on the Two Tubes case.
As Schiffer s view would have it, Arnold believes what he could
express by
(1) the object that now appears to me to be there is red
(2 ) the object that now appears to me to be here is red
(3 ) the object that now appears to me to be there =£ the object
that now appears to me to be here.
Our mission, on Schiffer s behalf, is to find suitable individual concepts for
there ' and "here ' to express. For at least two intertwined reasons, invoking
a notion of distance will not be helpful in Arnold s case. First, we may
suppose that all Arnold sees are closely- packed Sudafed pills, so the scene he
observes is full of little, red circles. This deprives him of any external point
of reference with respect to which distance can be measured. The essential
vagueness of the boundary of visual field 29 makes it" unsuitable here.
Second, even if it were suitable, any individual concept involving distance
would have to make extremely precise use of it, given how crowded with
small objects Arnold's visual field is. And, we may plausibly suppose, such
employment is beyond Arnold s ability; indeed, it s beyond the ability of
most observers 30 .
Even if distance is not gauged with precision in visual fields, there do
seem to be two properties that they ail have and which may well allow the
construction of suitable individual concepts. Visual fields are centered and
they are oriented, and they have these properties even when they are not
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filled with discriminated objects (as when the observer confronts a large,
white wall)3i. So by using the individual concept he could express by the
center of my visual field now'' (or, "the center of all that appears visually to
me now ) and by using the four properties of the field he could express by
being to the right
", "being to the left", "being above" and being below
", he
can construct a rough coordinate system for locating objects relative to the
center. For example, suppose that the pill Arnold thinks about in ( 1 ) is in
fact 5000 pills out from the center, on the right, at a 37 degree angle from
the horizontal axis, but that he is unable to locate it with such precision.
Beginning at the center, Arnold locates the pill nearest to the center in the
direction of the pill in question. That nearest pill will be definitely
describable by him as the pill that appears to me now to be nearest the
center and also above and to the right of the center". He proceeds in this
way, locating the nearest pill to the preceding one, until he reaches the pill in
question. By putting together all the individual concepts so expressible into
one "big individual concept (containing well over 5000 constituents^), he
gets an individual concept for the pill in question. And similarly for the
beliefs expressible by him in (2) and (3) 33 . I've described all this as if it
were a process that takes time, but that can t be an accurate description if
the resulting individual concept is to enter into what Arnold means by "this"
or there ". So we must imagine that at the time Arnold first has those
beliefs, the resulting individual concept is, so to speak, immediately in place.
Because it is natural to do so, I have been talking here of descriptions and
individual concepts for the pills, but since there are precisely analogous
cases in which, as remarked above, the observer faces a large, uniformly
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colored wall, the same sort of procedure will generate individual concepts for
the locations thought about by Arnold in (
1
'), (2') and (3 ).
I want to make three comments about this suggestion for finding
suitable individual concepts for Arnold's supposed uses of there and "here
First, there is some reason to hold that the four terms for orientation
properties mentioned above are themselves indexicals. When the rancher
says they went that a way, Sheriff
", and gestures appropriately, he
expresses his belief about a certain direction (and not just "the direction in
which I am now pointing "). Each of the four orientation properties may be
similarly indicated, as one thinks, for example "that direction is right of
center in my current visual field". The mere fact that the terms express
properties that can be had by more than one thing is no more embarrassing
than the fact that now" may be said to express a property - call it
'presentness - that can be had by more than one time. And just as
presentness cannot be had by more than one time at a time, "being there"
expresses, in the relevant sort of use, a property that cannot be had by more
than one place at a time34 . But I do not wish to press this point because I
am unsure how to argue further for it in a way that will not be viewed by
Schiffer as question-begging.
Second, the suggestion seems clearly to be open to a charge of
"psychological unreality". The notion of psychological reality in philosophy
of language and linguistics is one of the vaguest and most nebulous notions
that is also frequently invoked. Because of Schiffer s functionalist sympathies
and because he does not require that a believer be willing or, in some sense,
able to use the words in a definite description to express an individual
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concept which enters into his beliefs, it is difficult to tell what he regards as
criteria for the involvement of such a concept in a belief. Despite all this, it
does seem pretty clear that it is asking too much to require of Arnold the
immediate grasping of a 5000+-constituent individual concept when his
beliefs are those expressed in ( 1 ), (2), (3), or (
1
'), (2 ) (3 ). Perhaps what is
needed here is some distinction between the individual concept he expresses
by there and the analysis of that concept35. Schiffer does not mention any
such distinction, and I leave it to him to introduce it, if he desires it. And if
such a distinction were introduced, it would remove most of the motivation
for the description theory as Schiffer presents it3&.
My third, last and longest comment on the suggestion depends on how
we interpret the preceding talk of visual fields and locations in them. There
are two relevant possibilities. The first possibility is that there really are
visual fields and locations in them. Since even hallucinations of places not
otherwise seen present visual field locations, this might raise some difficult
questions (e.g., "where are they?). The second possibility is that visual field
talk is merely a convenient way of describing some of the properties of
visual experience - most prominently its geometrical properties - and is not
meant to imply the actual existence of things that are locations in a
hallucinated scene. The first interpretation is anathema to the spirit, if not
the already inscribed letter, of Schiffer s view. Were it adopted, it is hard to
see how one could deny that visual field locations are constituents of some
singular propositions, along with the believer and the time of belief. The
reason is that they would have precisely those visual properties that they
seemed (visually) to the believer to have, and thus would, like the sense
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data Schiffer eschews, pass the constraint on rationality (i), stated at the
beginning of the chapter 37 . So let us assume that visual field talk is to be
interpreted without commitment to the existence of visual field locations,
and is just a convenient way of talking about ways of being visually
appeared to, and relations among those ways. This, surely, is the modern
way.
But the modern way has, in this instance, some long-standing
problems. They are virtually the same as the main problems for the
adverbial theory of sensation38 . Since Schiffer s theory is rather close to
being an adverbial theory of belief, in which belief is self- ascription of a
purely qualitative property, it is perhaps not surprising that when it is
applied to perceptual belief, his theory would have to face some of the same
problems as bedevil the adverbial theory of sensation3?. The problem for
Schiffer s view can be seen in this way.
The crucial concept in accounting for Arnolds location- beliefs is one
he could express by the place that now appears to me to be at the center of
all that I see", or "the place at the center of my current visual field". But
now we are supposing that there are no such things as visual field locations,
when such talk is used to specify purely phenomenal properties. So it may
not be supposed that "the place at the center of my current visual field is F"
is true only if there is one and only one place at the center of Arnold's visual
field and it is F. We need some way of explicating "being appeared to
centrally is uniquely instantiated" that does not entail the existence of a
central location, and which ascribes only a purely qualitative relation
between the believer and the time of his belief. It is not clear how this is to
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be done, or even that it can be done. In his defense of The Adverbial
Approach to Visual Experience” 4 °, Michael Tye makes a proposal which we
can adapt for present purposes in this way. (It is fair to say that his is the
only extant proposed solution.)
(D 1 ) visual phenomenal property F is uniquely instantiated =df.
F has the property that it typically has when a normal perceiver
in standard circumstances visually perceives that there is one
and only one object that is F.
(There is an obvious generalization of (D1 ) to the definition schema for "n-
instantiated (n > 1 ). The generalization will be needed in accounting for such
beliefs as one expressible by red pills appear to me now to be in just 9
locations .) There are two kinds of problems with (D1 ) and its
generalizations that ought to be mentioned here.
First, it is notoriously difficult to give a satisfactory and non-circular
account of normal perceiver” and "standard circumstances”, as well as of
typically '. One recent writer has argued very persuasively that "there is no
unique set of standard conditions” under which an object has given
phenomenal properties, and that the notion of standard conditions is
strongly interest-relative41 . There is a great deal of work to be done on
these notions before they achieve respectability.
Second, one will need to postulate infinitely many rules of inference in
order to account for valid inferences of the form
(IS) F is n-instantiated
F is instantiated at least n-1 times
for n > 1
.
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My point here has not been to show that Schiffer’s view cannot meet
the problems I have been raising for it in this section. I simply point out
that there remains some substantial work to be done in defending the view.
I hope that I have succeeded in that limited goal42 .
I turn next to a brief discussion of the historical predecessor to
Schiffer s view and to adverbial theories of sensation. The view was Russell's.
Russell's use of sense data avoids some of the problems I have raised for
Schiffer's view, but it, too, rejects (A). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a view
that is more extreme than Russell s in placing restrictions on the possible
constituents of individual propositions.
Russell and Sense Data
Suppose that we were to try resolve the Two Tubes Puzzle in this way:
When Smith thinks this is red and that is red ", his belief is more
perspicuously representable as
(4) the object of which this' is an appearance is red and the
object of which that' is an appearance is red
(where the s on the demonstratives are meant to indicate that they're not
the same as the "this and that'' preceding (4)). As Smith could use it, H) is
meant to entail the existence of an object, x, which is an appearance, and
which is, in some sense, of the spot he then sees, and a distinct object, y,
which is an appearance, and which is also of the spot that he then sees; x and
y will seem exactly alike, except for their apparent spatial locations: x will
appear to be on the right, y will appear to be on the left. When Smith
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wonders, "Is this = that?", he wonders whether or not these two appearances
are appearances of the same object.
In order to prevent the same sort of problem from arising about x and
y as arose about the spot seen, it must be held that x and y are necessarily
such that Smith cannot wonder, at the time he has them, "Is x - y?" It would
be ad hoc simply to stipulate this without any further explanation. What
more can be said about the nature of such appearances to achieve the
desired result? We must keep in mind that it is possible, on any plausible
construal of perceptual property
,
to have beliefs about one s appearances
that involve other than their perceptual properties; for example, Smith may
think to himself, this' is my favorite appearance". Simply requiring that
appearances have all and only the perceptual properties they appear (to the
believer) to have ignores this possibility. On the other hand, it is wrong to
suppose that the appearances have all and only the properties they are
believed (by the believer) to have; for suppose that Smith believes
something of the form, "this is an appearance of something that exists and is
F." Then his belief, together with the latter supposition, will entail that there
really is an F, whatever F may be. True belief cannot be that easy to achieve;
it must be possible to make some mistakes about what one perceives.
Russell s view in "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by
Description" seeks to avoid this problem, and may be seen as partially
motivated by such puzzles as the Two Tubes Puzzle43 . The view imposes
severe restrictions on the possible constituents of propositions.
The fundamental principle in the analysis of propositions
containing descriptions is this: Every proposition which we can
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understand must be consti tuted wholly of constituents with
which we are acquainted^
We shall say that we have acquaintance with anything of which
we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process
of inference or any knowledge of truths4 ?.
We have acquaintance in sensation with the data of the outer
senses, and in introspection with the data of what may be called
inner sense - thoughts, feelings, desires, etc.; we have
acquaintance in memory with things which have been either of
the outer senses or of the inner sense. Further, it is probable,
though not certain, that we have acquaintance with Self, as that
which is aware of things or has desires towards things.
In addition to our acquaintance with particular existing things,
we also have acquaintance with what we shall call universal.
that is to say, general ideas such as whiteness, diversity.
brotherhood, and so on....Awareness of universals is called
conceiving, and a universal of which we are aware is called a
concept4 6.
On Russell s view, there are in the Two Tubes case two exactly similar
red, circular sense data, x and y, which differ only in their locations in
Smith's visual field, and of which Smith is directly aware. He believes that
the physical object which causes x is red (similarly for y); and he wonders if
it s the same object that causes both x and y. That is, he believes what he
could more perspicuously express as follows:
(5) (Ez)(w)[(w causes this -> z=w) & w is red]
(6) (Ez'Kw)l(w causes that' -> z'=w) & w is red]
And he wonders if, as he could think it,
(7) (Ez)((w)(w causes this' -> z=w) &. (Ez')l(w)(w causes that ->
z'=w) & z=z']}.
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where (7) is the Russellian rendering of "the thing that causes this" = the
thing that causes that'". But our original question - What is it about the
nature of acquaintance and its objects that make it impossible for Smith to
wonder, "Is this" = that ?"? - is not yet answered. I know of no clear, direct
answer to this question in Russell's writings47 . It is, I think, an important




Carnap, and Goodman5°, that there is an irreducibly demonstrative element
in perception, an insight built into sense datum theory at its foundation. The
difficulties presented for Schiffer s theory in "Being There" suggest to me
that this insight has been lost sight of in some recent work on belief and
reference; and so I recall that theory here5C
A Modal Objection
There remains one serious, albeit standard, objection to be made to
Schiffer's view. In Chapter I, I presented an intuition, forcefully and
skillfully deployed by Kripke52
i
the use of which allows him to argue that
description theories of indexicals, demonstratives and proper names give the
wrong truth conditions for propositions expressed by uses of sentences
containing such terms. Schiffer's view is inconsistent with that intuition,
though it makes exceptions' for T” and "now". Suppose, for example, that
Arnold or Stephen fixes his attention on some one pill or cup and believes,
"that one is red". The proposition believed thereby is, on the aforementioned
intuition, an individual proposition true only in those worlds in which the
very object actually attended to exists and is red. Schiffer rejects this claim
and the intuition on which it is based. He says, "...no one who had
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understood and accepted the description theory would in the least be
inclined to accept... the intuition53. in addition to rejecting the intuition,
Schiffer s view entails that Stephen's belief, and any other belief about a
contingent object, is true only in those possible situations in which Stephen
himself and the time of his belief exist; they are, after all, constituents of all
those propositions. Putting aside questions about the essential nature of
times, it remains counterintuitive to claim that what "that's a rock" expresses
(as used by me when I attend to a rock) requires my existence for its truth.
I take these facts about Schiffer s view to be sufficiently objectionable
by themselves to make it worthwhile to examine other approaches to the
Two Tubes Puzzle. The problems I have been discussing in this section are
taken seriously by Plantinga, who suggests a way of resolving them.
Roughly, his idea is that the properties expressed say, by demonstratives,
are expressed by definite descriptions of the form, "the object which is
actually F"; and that they therefore express essences of the object thought
about. I discuss Plantinga s suggestion and Ackerman s related use of
essences in the next chapter.
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PLANTINGA AND ACKERMAN ON ESSENCES
In Chapter III, I discussed Schiffer's views on belief. Schiffer holds
that, except for I and "now", singular terms for contingent objects are non-
rigid, and this leaves him open to the modal criticism with which I ended the
last chapter. Some philosophers who are nevertheless sympathetic to the
view that proper names, demonstratives and some indexicals have or bear
significant epistemic relation to definite-descriptive content, are troubled by
this modal criticism. One such philosopher is Alvin Plantinga, and he has
made a suggestion for compromise. In "The Boethian Compromise"!, he
recommends a method for securing rigidity while retaining definite-
descriptive content. Although his proposals are directed only at proper
names, I will adapt them to the purpose of providing a resolution of the Two
Tubes Puzzle. In the last part of this chapter, I discuss the views of Diana
Ackerman. Her view, like Plantingas, embraces essences, but it avoid some
of the problems for Plantinga s view. As she herself is quick to point out,
however, her view has some rather serious problems of its own. But her
view may well offer the optimum essence solution to the Two Tubes Puzzle.
Plantingas Proposal
The relevant part of Plantinga s theory may be summarized as follows:
(E) Proper names express essences
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Plantinga s main proposal about which essences are expressed by proper
names is:
(Al) The essences that a proper name expresses are expressed
by descriptions of the form "the F-in-<a", where "F-in-<a"' is the
(“-transform of the predicate "F".
Because I am concerned here with questions about demonstratives and
indexicals, I will assume, with one qualification to be noted, that versions of
<E) and (Al) also apply to demonstratives and indexicals. The one
qualification is that I want to leave open the question whether a version of
(Al) also applies to I and now'. Although, as I have already stated in
Chapter II, I believe that these indexicals ought to be accorded no special
treatment
,
one might wish to exempt them from the transformation of (A).
In what follows, I will focus on applications of a version of (Al) to
demonstratives in attempting to resolve the Two Tubes Puzzle.
Plantinga does not offer a general account of which descriptions
express the essences expressed by proper names, demonstratives and
indexicals, though he makes several suggestions - parasitic on views about
proper names held by Russell, by Frege, by Searle, and by Donnellan and
Kripke - about which descriptions one might associate with them. I will not
discuss those suggestions here; it will suffice for my purposes to use
syntactically simple suggestions parasitic on Russell s views.
Both (Al) and (E) (the (“-transform principle and the Essence principle,
respectively) need some further explanation; specifically, more needs to be
said about what Plantinga means by essence ", "express'' and (“-transform
About what names, etc., and definite descriptions express, Plantinga
has this to say 2 :
( 1
)
(a) A definite description "the F" expresses the same
property as does is the sole F". (b) A proper name, N,
expresses fin English) a property, F, if there is a definite
description,D, in English or some extension of English, such that:
(1) D expresses F and (ii) N and D are intersubstitutable salva
propositione in sentences of the form, t is F'.
1 will also suppose that ( l)(b) holds for uses of demonstratives and
indexicals. ( 1 )(b )(ii) is based on the following principle of propositional
identity, on which Plantinga seems clearly to rely:
(2) Proposition P = proposition Q iff Necessarily, (S)(A)((S is a
person & A is a propositional attitude) — > (S has A to P iff S has
A to Qj).
1 will not try to say exactly how ( 1 )(b)(ii) is based on (2); 1 hope that the
connection is clear enough for present purposes.
Plantinga characterizes the notion of an essence of an existing entity
as follows:
(3) e is an essence of x =df. (i) e is a property; (ii) it is possible
that x has e; (iii) it is necessary that if x exists, then x has e; and
(iv) it is necessary that (y)(if y has e, then x=y).
Plantinga characterizes notions of (©-transforms for both predicates and
properties:
(4) The (©-transform of a predicate, F", is "F-in-(© ", where <© is
a proper name of the actual world.
(5) The @ -transform of a property, F, is the world- indexed
property of being F-in-(®, where <© is a proper name of the
actual world.
((5) can be written without a use- mention confusion; I hope that it is clear
enough as it stands.) The following relationship is said to hold between fa-
transform predicates and properties: if the predicate "F" expresses the
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property F, then the ^-transform of "F" (i e . "F-in-» I expresses the property
being F-in-(a3.
Finally,
(6) x has property F in state of affairs w =df. it is necessary
that, if w is actual, then x has F.
Plugging inV for "w" in (6) yields a definition of "i has F in It is not
hard to show that for any object, i, and property, F. if x is the sole F. then the
(?) -transform of F, being F-in-<?>, is an essence of xA
(It should be noted that Plantinga takes the notion of logical necessity
as primitive, and explains the notion of possible world in terms of it, the
notion of a state of affairs, the notion of a state of affairs' obtaining (or, being
actual), and several logical notions5. For present purposes, we may assume
that propositions are just states of affairs, and that possible worlds are
maximal consistent propositions. The actual world will be assumed to be the
true maximal consistent proposition.)
Transformed Essences and the Two Tubes Puzzle
Plantinga considers it to be one of the most important features of his
theory that names, etc., may express essences that are logically equivalent
but epistemically inequivalent. (Essence e is logically equivalent to essence e
if there is no possible world in which e is exemplified by an object that does
not exemplify e Essence e is epistemically inequivaient to essence e if it is
possible to know or believe that an object has e without knowing or
believing that it has e 6 ) Among the examples he gives of pairs of logically
equivalent but epistemically inequivalent essences are being Socrates best
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st u dent m b eing Aristotle s teacher in @ (both had by Plato); and being a
heavenly body last visible in the morning in ta. being a heavenly body first
visible in the evening in o (both had by Venus). Presumably, Plantinga s
reason for thinking that these pairs of properties are epistemically
mequivalent is that their non-world indexed portions’ are epistemically
mequivalent.
Let us now see how (Al) and (E) allow Plantinga to resolve the Two
Tubes Puzzle in a way that accounts for Smith s rational ignorance and
avoids the modal objection to which Schiffer s view is open.
Suppose that, on a Russellian theory, Smith uses "this ‘ as semantically
equivalent to (or short for) "the object that now appears to me to be on the
right
,
and that he uses that as short for the object that now appears to me
to be on the left". Consider these two portions of Smith s interior monologue
(see Chapter II):
(7) I know that this = this.
(8) I do not know that this = that.
Plantinga s view provides an explanation for the truth of (7) and (8): the two
demonstratives, as used by Smith, express for Smith different, epistemically
inequivalent essences: this", as Smith uses it, expresses the property that he
could express by being the object that now appears to me to be on the right
in <a whereas "that", as Smith uses it, expresses the property that he could
express by being the object that now appears to me to be on the left in o .
(7) and (8) may thus be rewritten more perspicuously (on Plantinga s view)
as:
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(7 ) I know that the object that now appears to me to be on the
right in is the object that now appears to me to be on the
right in <a
(8 ) l don t know that the object that now appears to me to be
on the right in <a is the object that now appears to me to be on
the left in .
Thus rewritten, it seems easy to see how both could be true, for the object of
Smith s knowledge in (7 ) is different from the object of his ignorance in (8 ).
The latter virtue is also a virtue of any description theory. What is
distinctive of Plantinga s view is that it also has the consequence that the
propositions expressed in (7) and (8) are contingent truths. This may be
seen most easily if we add the following to Smith s interior monologue:
(9 ) I know that this is the object that now appears to me to be
on the right.
If we are to avoid the modal objection made against Schiffer s view, what
Smith knows in (9) must be a contingent truth. Plantinga's view secures this
result, for on his view, what (9) says is just what Smith could equally well
express by
(9 ) I know that the object that now appears to me to be on the
right in <a is the object that now appears to me to be on the
right.
And the proposition known here is contingent: there are worlds in which the
very spot that Smith does in fact see remains unobserved by anyone, and so
appears to no one in any way; it is a merely contingent truth that Smith
happens to observe it at all, and a contingent truth that it looks the way it
actually does to him.
So Plantinga's view seems to have a clear modal advantage over the
sort of description theory advocated by Schiffer.
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The Greater Ignorance of Smith: First Object inn
I will next present two criticisms of Plantinga s proposal. My first
criticism is a simple one. There seems to be no question that, as Smith uses
them, (7) and (9) express truths. Now, as Plantinga notes, there seem to be
propositions that some of us are unable to believe because we do ...not even
possess the concepts necessary to apprehend (them)..."?. As an example, he
mentions the proposition that twenty-seven eighths of the definite integral,
from zero to two, of the function f(x)=x 2 is odd, which, he says, those of us
with "an imperfect grasp of the calculus" are unable even to believe.
Suppose, then, that Smith, like most medical students, has never studied The
Nature of Necessity, is unfamiliar with possible world semantics, has never
heard of any work in recent semantical theory, and has never wondered
about logical necessity. In short, suppose that Smith does not even possess
the concepts necessary to apprehend propositions of the form "the F in <a is
G and so, for example, is unable even to believe the propositions involved in
(7 ) and (9 ). It is thus wrong to have described Smith as abie to include
these in his interior monologue, and these therefore do not tell us
propositions that he expresses by his uses of "this" or "that".
Plantinga might try to argue, in response, that Smith does not lack the
concepts necessary to apprehend ^-transform propositions because we all
acquire such basic concepts in learning to acquire even the simple perceptual
beliefs of the sort Smith has. But since he is willing to grant that those with
an imperfect grasp of the calculus may not be able to grasp many of its
propositions, I don t see how he would argue for that claim. I doubt that he
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would try. Nor do I see any room in the doctrine of propositions (see
Chapter I) for making sense of partially grasped propositions
; there is no
more room for the latter than there is for partially believed propositions
Although this objection is one that I take seriously, it bedevils many
proposals besides Plantinga s (e.g., Schiffer's). What is distinctive of
Plantmga s proposal is (A), the <a -transform principle, and I want next to
consider an objection that focusses more squarely on that principle.
Smith s Other-Worldly Ignorance: A Second Objection
My second objection is somewhat more complex than the first. The
reader will have noticed that Plantinga has introduced a new name as part of
his proposal: V. The purpose of my second objection is to force
investigation of the question, which essence, if any, does V express?"
I will now describe a situation involving a pair of coreferential names
in which linguistic behavior just like Smith s is involved, but for which
Plantinga s proposal is unable to account.
Suppose that the referent of the name «?> is fixed, rigidly and
connotationlessly, by means of the definite description, the actual world".
Suppose also that the referent of the name # is fixed, rigidly and
connotationlessly, by means of the definite description, the possible world
most often named by Plantinga . As a matter of fact, the actual world is the
possible world most often named by Plantinga, but Smith, whom we may
suppose, is aware of the fixing of <a and doesn t keep up with the
philosophical literature, so when he considers he either dissents from
it or withholds assent to it. Thus, we may suppose, although Smith will assert
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UO l the object that now appears to me to be on the right
IS the object that now appears to me to be on the right
in <s>
as part of hts interior monologue, he will there refrain from asserting
(11) the object that now appears to me to be on the right in » is
the object that now appears to me to be on the right.
We cannot account for the asymmetry in Smith's attitudes by
supposing that he knows (or believes) what he could express by (10), but
does not know [or believe) what he could express by ( 1 1 ). The reason is that
( 1 0 ) and ( 1 1 ) differ only with respect to the namesV and both of
which have been stipulated to be connotationless; consequently, the very
same proposition is expressed by both, as Smith uses these sentences. This
case therefore presents us with linguistic facts just like those presented by
the Two Tubes Puzzle, but the former case is not one for which Plantinga's
proposal can account.
This line of reasoning does not, of course, present a counterexample to
)A), Plantinga's ^-transform principle. But it does, I think, detract
considerably from whatever appearance of explanatory power (Ai) derives
from consideration of the Two Tubes Puzzle and similarly problematic
examples.
How might Plantinga reasonably reply? He might either deny that we
could speak a language in which some terms are rigidly and
connotationlessly fixed - a denial which seems implausible - or he might
insist that his proposal is a proposal about how, as a matter of fact, English
names, demonstratives and indexicals work (where the evidence for how
they work is linguistic behavior like that of Smith's). The purpose of
insisting this would be to provide room for application of ( Al) to >" and
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thus forcing a difference between the propositions Smith would express by
*10) and ( 1 1 ). This may be done by explaining how 'V and differ in
connotation: they might have different connotations or one might lack any
connotation, while the other had some connotation. So, it might be held, as
an empirical thesis about English, that by attempting to stipulate that be
lixed, rigidly and connotationlessly, on the possible world most often named
by Plantinga, we instead bring it about that
" n " expresses the essence being
the possible world most often named by Plantinga in » if so, then the
object of Smith s ignorance in (11) would be, as he could put it,
(11 s ) the object that now appears to me to be on the right in
the possible world most often named by Plantinga in <® is the
object that now appears to me to be on the right.
This still leaves open the question whether or not @> has connotation. Let
us examine what Plantinga s view has to say in answer.
If has connotation, then what is its connotation? Note that we
cannot explain Smith s behavior with ( 10) and ( 1 1 ) by claiming that, instead
of lixing >" connotationlessly on the actual world, we bring it about that,
contrary to our stated intention, 'V expresses the property of being the
actual world - a property which is had only contingently by (®, the world
which is in fact actual. For then the subject of (10) would not express an
essence and ( 10) would not express a contingent truth, true only in those
worlds in which the spot actually seen exists; instead, what it expresses
would be true in any world in which Smith believed himself to be seeing
some spot or other that appeared to be on the right of his current visual
field.
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Could we instead hold that V expresses the essence being the arn.m
—rld m <a; or lhe essence bemg identical to »? More generally, we may ask:
Should Plantinga hold that V" expresses an essence that can also be
expressed by some term or predicate containing a use of >"? That is: Does
(A), the (©-transform principle, apply toV itself? The answer to ail of these
questions seems clearly to be No", because the proposals they offer simply
fail to answer the question, "What, in each of its uses, does V express?"
There are, of course, at least two alternatives open to Plantinga here:
hold that (Al) does not apply toV itself, although (E) does; or hold that only
by means of the description "the actual world" (or its synonyms) can one fix
<»
,
rigidly and connotationlessly, on the actual world (and thus abandon
both (Al) and (E) in the case of "<»"). Of these two alternatives, I think that
the first is to be preferred, and would be preferred by Plantinga. My reason
for thinking so is that the second alternative saddles one with a possible
worlds version of the Two Tubes Puzzle. In fact, we have already introduced
the materials for such a version in the discussion of (10) and (11), above. All
that remains is for the»analogy to be made explicit.
So suppose that > and "#" are fixed, rigidly and connotationlessly,
exactly as above, and that Smith is aware of the fixing. Let us abbreviate the
predicate obtained from (10) by substituting "x" for > " by Rx". Smith's
interior monologue will then go like this:
(12) I know that I know that: <©=(© and and is R, but I
wonder: is (®= # ?, and I wonder: is # R?, and I don t know that
(®= #
,
or that n is R.
If we refrain from applying either (Al) or (E) here, a by now familiar
problem recurs. Given our assumptions here, the proposition that «»=<»
simply is the proposition that (©=#, and Smith can t know one without
knowing the other; similarly, for him to know that <© is R (i.e., to know what
he would express by (10)) is for him to know that * is R (i.e., what he would
express by ( 1 1 )). So he can't wonder as he does, after all. But this is wrong.
The parallel between the cases can be made even closer if we suppose
that it is somehow possible to think demonstratively about possible worlds.
Smith might then think, that world is <?>, and this world is #, but I wonder, is
this world the actual world?'' If we grant the possibility of demonstrating
worlds, then I think that we must also grant the possibility of wondering in
this way. Perhaps God can see at a glance which world is actual, but most of
the rest of us can try to resolve such ignorance only by comparing what we
know with what <a entails; at best, however, that will leave the non-
ommscient with infinitely many candidates for the status of actual world.
In Chapter II, I indicated roughly how I would argue against a
metalinguistic solution to the Two Tubes Puzzle. One of Plantinga s stated
purposes in offering his view8 is to avoid such metalinguistic solutions to
puzzles about belief and reference. Hence, in this case, he cannot
consistently hold that when Smith thinks to himself > is R", he thereby
entertains the metalinguistic proposition that "> is R expresses a truth .
Given what > is R expresses as Smith would use it, adopting the latter sort
of metalinguistic solution would be tantamount to holding that one never
believes an (©-transform proposition, but always instead believes a
metalinguistic proposition to the effect that the corresponding (©-transform
sentence expresses some true proposition.
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None of my criticisms weighs against (E), the essence principle. Each of
them is directed at (A), the ^.-transform principle. But since it is the latter
that is distinctive of Plantinga s view, these criticisms raise serious questions
about the acceptability of the view.
It is, of course, still open to Plantinga to hold that >" expresses an
essence of the actual world (or that some uses of 'V
1
express different,
epistemically inequivalent essences of the actual world). But then he owes
us an account of how ordinary English speakers come to grasp such an
essence, without there being a specification of it in terms of ^-transforms.
Plantinga s proposal seems, therefore, to have little more to recommend it
than a view which simply postulates multiple, epistemically inequivalent
essences of each object, to be expressed by proper names, demonstratives
and indexicals used to refer to the object. Such a view would have all the
advantages of stipulation over honest theoretical toil.
I turn next to discussion of the views of Diana Ackerman, who holds
that uses of tokens of demonstratives, indexicals and proper names express
essences not expressible by any definite description.
Ackerman's Essences
Ackerman sets out to give a theory of names, demonstratives,
indexicals (and natural kind terms) that preserves the following three
plausible principles:
The Essence Principle : Each use of a proper name,
demonstrative or indexical expresses an essence, and so such
terms are rigid designators.
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Ihe Propositional Attitude Principle If II' and 12 are
singular terms which are not interchangeable salva veritate
whenever used in propositional attitude contexts, then TT and
T2 have different connotations. (The connotation of a singular
term is the property that term expresses, and which is that
term s semantic contribution to determining what proposition is
expressed by the sentence token in which the term occurs.)
Ihe Causal Principle: An entity, x, is the referent of a token (as
used on a particular occasion) of a proper name, demonstrative
or indexical if and only if x has a particular complex causal
relation to the token of the term so used, regardless of what
entity, if any, has the properties the users of the term believe
its referent to have. (Ackerman calls this complex causal
relation, "R".)9
One qualification must be added to the Propositional Attitude Principle:
Ackerman intends it to apply to particular uses of tokens of singular terms,
and not to their syntactic types. This qualification renders the Propositional
Attitude Principle less persuasive than might seem at first reading. For T1
and T2 to be interchangeable for a person S at a time t seems to mean that
( 1 ) S used ...Tl...
; and (ii) had S used T2 instead, the resulting token would
have expressed a true proposition. But this is not refuted by showing that it
is logically possible for S to have correctly used "...Tl.." so that the
substitution would have preserved truth. How is the Principle to be applied
to establish differences in connotation, then? In what for Ackerman is its
most important application, she uses it to argue for the conclusion that no
proper name, etc., has the same connotation as any definite description 10
She says that it is logically possible that a person. S. believe that T is T.
without believing that T is the F, where F is any property whatever. She
concludes that "T" and the F" are not interchangeable salva veritate in ail
belief contexts, and uses the Propositional Attitude Principle to conclude.
s
I urther, that "T" and the F" differ in connotation. If we make explicit the
necessary reference to particular tokens as used at particular times by S. the
argument seems to be this: suppose that, at t, S thinks or says. "T is T With
that token, he then expresses a proposition, P, which we may represent as an
ordered set of connotations: <conn(T'), connCis ). connCTk Imagine now a
situation qualitatively indiscernible from the first, except that in it, S thinks
or says at t, "T is the F", thereby using the very same token of "T is" and
expressing a proposition, Q, which we may represent as this ordered set of
connotations: <conn( T ), conn( is"), conn( the F")>. Ackerman seems to think
that we can see that there is some possible situation in which Q is distinct
from P, and so P is distinct from Q, since it, unlike Q, is possibly distinct from
0- It would then follow that conn(T') is not connC'the F"). The appeal made
in the argument thus seems to be, in the most thorough-going sense, an
appeal to intuition. In conversation, she has remarked that the argument
may be used with equal plausibility to obtain the conclusion that
connotations are private and evanescent : a connotation is private to S if it is
logically impossible for anyone but S to entertain or express it; a connotation
is evanescent if it is logically impossible for it to be entertained or expressed
at more than exactly one time 1 Even if one does not share Ackerman s
skeptical intuitions, a type-of-use (as distinguished from token-use) version
of the Propositional Attitude Principle will yield the result that it is an
extremely rare event for two people to entertain or express the same
connotation, or for one person to entertain or express the same connotation
at two different times. And a type-version will yield the result that, in a
given speaker s idiolect, the type of, say, a name, N" differs in connotation
rO
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from that of any type of definite description. I will suppose, then, that some
version of the Propositional Attitude Principle may be used to argue for a
conclusion felicitously stated by saying that proper names, etc., lack
descriptive connotations. Ackerman proposes instead that they have non-
descriptive connotations.
Although it is not possible, therefore, to say which non- descriptive
connotations are by giving a synonymous definite description, Ackerman
does say that it is possible to give analyses of such connotations. She has not
yet been able to give what she regards as a satisfactory account of what she
means by analysis" 12 . But she does say some things about the relation
between a term's non-descriptive connotation, C, and its analysis, A. First,
examples of the sort of analysis she has in mind are provided by the various
attempts to analyse the concept of knowledge; one unsuccessful attempt at
this sort of analysis is the justified true belief" analysis of knowledge. This
is also meant to illustrate the fact that analyses may not preserve identity of
connotation. Second, she says that it is necessary and knowable a priori by
the term user that an entity is C if and only if it is A. Third, the latter
equivalence can be discovered by generalizing from the replies that the user
of the term gives to simple counterfactual questions about his or her use of
the term 1 3. And fourth, she says that the analysans, A, has as a constituent
the term user's percept token of the term 14 . Although she does not say
whether the percept token could exist in a world without the term itself
existing there, it does seem an intended consequence of the fourth condition
that A exists in no world in which the percept token does not exist. A
further intended consequence of the latter is, it seems to me, the result that
A exists only where the user does.
At one time, Ackerman held that for any proper name, etc., T ", its
analysis is expressed by the entity standing in R to T in * For reasons
precisely similar to those I discussed in criticising Plantinga s use of <a -
translorms. above, she is now inclined to reject this view about the analyses
ol connotations. Two alternatives she considers that do without & -
translorms are these: (i) there is a... property that is [for the term userj a
prion equivalent to the property of standing in R to T" but which is also an
essence of its bearer. This property would also be said to be irreducible, not
to have its bearer as a constituent, and not to be specifiable any further 15
(ii) Abandon the Essence Principle, but retain the other two. As Ackerman
presents it, (ii) entails that it is necessarily true that an entity is C if and only
if it is the entity bearing R to "T" (where C is the connotation of "T" in the
term-user s idiolect), a consequence she grants is counterintuitive 16 . But a
view that abandons the Essence Principle is a view that is open to the modal
objection of the first and preceding chapters, so I shall ignore (ii) here.
Ackerman s view thus construed (with (i)) is made to order for
dealing with the Two Tubes Puzzle. (She makes a similar observation about
what her view does for Kripke's Puzzle.) As Smith uses them, this and
that express different essences of the spot he sees, neither is synonymous
with any definite description (world-indexed, or otherwise), and the
difference between them is to be analysed (in some sense of "analysis'") in
terms of the fact that he uses two different terms (tokens) to refer to the
spot. Smith can, on this view, know a priori of the essence that he expresses
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by this I that 1 that it is equivaJent to the property of bearing R to this
( 11581 ’ differences between the causal relations he bears to the spot that
result Irom that fact that he sees it with two different eyes do not alter the
relation R or otherwise enter into the analyses. This reflects the fact that he
may be ignorant of such differences.)
To put it picturesquely, Smith can never get into closer cognitive
contact with the spot than to apprehend an essence of it. Since Smith is in
optimum circumstances for believing an individual proposition with the spot
as a constituent, Ackerman s view proposes, in effect, that in an individual
proposition we always replace the object itself with one of its essences. We
can, if we wish, think of this view as one that restricts the possible
constituents ol individual propositions to abstracta such as irreducible
essences and other properties. But Ackerman s fourth condition on analyses,
above, suggests that she would also allow such incorrigibly known mental
entities as percept tokens to be constituents of individual propositions.
However else we choose to think of it, we must admit that Ackerman s
view (with (i)) solves the Two Tubes Puzzle and at the same time
incorporates three initially plausible principles about reference and belief.
Of course, as Ackerman herself is quick to point out, alternative (i) looks
problematic" 17 . Some may feel also that the solution comes close to being a
solution by stipulation, and so is ad hoc . Because the methodological issues
are difficult and ill-defined here, I will not attempt to adjudicate the latter
charge. I will assume instead that (i) is sufficiently problematic to make
examination of another approach to solution worthwhile. But it may well be
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that Ackerman s view provides the best essence solution to the Two Tubes
Puzzle.
In light of the problems with the views of this and the preceding
chapter, it might appear that a solution to the Two Tubes Puzzle will require
a radical shift. In the next chapter, I examine the views of Robert Stalnaker,
who encourages such a shift - one which allows him to reject (B) instead of
(A) of the Puzzle, and to deny, therefore, that Smith is in optimum
circumstances for believing individual propositions with the spot he sees as a
constituent.
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BELIEVING LESS BY BELIEVING MORE-
STALNAKER AND THE DEFEAT OF BELIEF
In the preceding two chapters, we have considered the views of
Schiffer, Plantinga and Ackerman and how those views may most plausibly
be employed to resolve the Two Tubes Puzzle. Although there are significant
differences among these views, we may characterize their agreements in this
way: they all reject assumption (A) of the puzzle
(A) It is possible that a believer believe an individual
proposition with a contingent thing other than himself as a
constituent.
because they all restrict the range of possible constituents of individual
propositions, and the circumstances under which such propositions may be
believed and expressed. (They might not put their agreement in this way,
but I think that it does no violence to their insights to do so 1 .) In this
chapter, I will examine a view which, as I interpret it, accepts (A), but which
gives principled justification for rejecting (B) of the puzzle:
(B) If (A) is true, then Smith believes the individual proposition
he expresses by "this = this" and the individual proposition he
expresses by "that = that".
The view is Robert Stalnaker's, presented in his Tndexicai Belief" 2 .
Recall that (B) was my way of recording the alleged fact that Smith is in
optimum perceptual circumstances for believing the individual propositions
in question, the fact, that is, that no one is ever in a better position to believe
or know such individual propositions. (I made similar assumptions in (B ),
for the case of the Augmented Messy Shopper. See Chapter II, "The
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Examples Made Parallel .) As 1 interpret his view. Stalnaker denies this
assumption of optimality; rather, he gives us an interesting and persuasive
rationale for introducing defeatiers) of belief in individual propositions, and
for iinding them in Smith's consequently less-than-optimal situation.
Because Stalnaker s presentation of his view is both highly programmatic
and subtle, I am less confident than in other cases that my interpretation is
correct. 1 am confident that the view I present in this chapter is well worth
considering, even if it is not Stalnaker s own. As I remark in my Postscript,
it may be one of the last, best hopes for the doctrine of propositions. 1 also
show, in this chapter, that it has some strongly counterintuitive
consequences when applied to an apparently paradigmatic case of
persistence of belief.
I begin my presentation of Stalnaker s view with discussion of his
conception of proposition, and with exposition of the technique of
diagonalization, introduced in his essay, "Assertion" 3 . It is the latter
technique that will be applied to yield a solution to the Two Tubes Puzzle.
Possible Worlds, Propositions, and Pragmatics
According to Stalnaker, belief is a two-term relation between a
believer and a proposition, where "[p]ropositions...are functions from possible
worlds into truth values 4 or, equivalently, sets of possible worlds5.
Intuitively, the alternative possible worlds that belong in the set are those
that are compatible with what the believer believes 6 . Stalnaker writes
Propositions. ..are functions from possible worlds into truth
values. Equivalently, but more informally, they are ways of
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dividing a space of possibilities - ways of picking out some
subset Irom a set of alternative ways things might be The
intuitive idea behind this conception of proposition is an old
one: it is the idea that what is essential to propositional or
iniormational content is that certain possibilities be excluded.
To say or believe something informative is to rule something
out - to say or believe that some of the ways the world might
have been are not the ways it is. The content of what one says
or believes should be understood in terms of the possibilities
that are excluded 7 .
His use of the phrase possible worlds has prompted some to criticize
Stalnaker for making believers far more opinionated than they actually are.
for if the objects of belief contain the absolutely maximal objects usually
meant by possible world", he implies that we all have an opinion, one way
or the other, about everything. As Lawrence Powers once complained,
Apparently, [Stalnaker!. ..thinks that when we ordinarily talk
about alternative possible situations we are talking about
alternative possible worlds . This seems clearly false.
Consider the concept of a possible lifetime fruit diet. To specify
X s lifetime fruit diet is to specify ail the pieces of fruit X eats in
his whole lifetime. Now suppose someone offers me a choice
between an apple and a banana. I am to choose between two
possible lor available) pieces of fruit. Am I now choosing
between possible lifetime fruit diets?. ..It is false that the
concept of a lifetime fruit diet is deeply involved in our
ordinary way of regarding choices between apples and
bananas8 .
But Stalnaker has explained in response that one need not, and that he does
not. take the phrase possible world" to mean an absolutely maximal object.
Rather, he says,
...the alternative possibilities used to define propositions must
be exclusive alternatives which are maximally specific, relative
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to the distinctions that might be made in the context at han d 9
(Italics mine.)
“ '
To give some idea of what Stalnaker has in mind here, consider the
following simple example. Two traffic engineers are engaged in a discussion
of traffic lights, and they restrict their attention to just three colors during
the discussion: red, yellow and green. They ignore the fact that these colors
come in many shades. They are also aware that the lights show just one color
at a time. In this context, the relevant alternatives are, with respect to any
given traffic light and time, just these: it's red, it's yellow, it’s green; and
these are maximally specific and exclusive, given the severely restricted
purposes of the discussion. One says to the other, pointing at one traffic
light, that s neither red nor yellow '. Given the context, he would have
expressed the very same proposition if he had instead said, "that’s green".
Most discussions are not quite so dully restricted, but almost all are
restricted in some way to a range of properties and possibilities of interest.
And the situation is similar for undiscussed belief. Unless one is an
unusually compulsive physicist, the content of what one believes when one
thinks of some particular piece of fruit, that’s an orange" neither excludes
nor includes any possibilities regarding the contingent sub -atomic structure
of fruit. ("Do you think that orange contains any quarks?” we ask; the
believer replies, "It hadn't occurred to me to wonder. I simply wasn't
thinking of that as a possibility ") Or so, I believe, Stalnaker would say.
This raises new questions, but none, I think, that need trouble us here;
we can fix the features of any context we discuss so that the questions will
be irrelevant.
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Stalnaker also agrees with many philosophers discussed so far (e g.,
Heidelberger, Plantinga, Ackerman, Perry, Kripke) that there are
...independently plausible semantical ruiesJ'io according to which uses of
proper names, indexicals and demonstratives are rigid designators. But
there is, he says, a clash between straightforward application of these rules
and his conception of belief. Since there is only the barest hint of why there
should be a clash here in what I have already quoted (see ’...possibilities that
are excluded...
,
above), we need to see more clearly what it is about
Stalnaker s conception of belief that gives rise to this clash. This is best done
by first taking a closer look at what he says about assertions made using
proper names, and at how, in such cases of assertion, he proposes to resolve
the clash. Having surveyed what is clearest, we can then return to
consideration of Stalnaker s views on unasserted belief and demonstrative
belief.
Diagonalizing Assertions
Suppose that O'Leary and Daniels are having an astronomical
argument, and are concerned solely with which celestial bodies, visible to the
naked eye, are where when. O'Leary, whose background in the sciences is
pretty weak, asserts, Hesperus is Mars ’. Daniels, who has learned the little
astronomy he knows from reading Quine, disagrees: he asserts, Hesperus is
Venus '. Given their present concerns, they both grant that Hesperus, Venus
and Mars exist, but disagree about which is which. 0 Learv and Daniels thus
share a great many of what Stalnaker calls presuppositions .
95
Roughly speaking, the presuppositions of a speaker are the
propositions whose truth he takes for granted as part of the
background of the conversation. A proposition is presupposed
if the speaker is disposed to act as if he assumes or believes
that the proposition is true, and as if he assumes or believes
that his audience assumes or believes that it is true as well.
Presuppositions are what is taken by the speaker to be the
common ground of the participants in the conversation, what is
treated as their common knowledge or mutual knowledge
...the more fundamental way of representing the speaker's
presuppositions is not as a set of propositions, but rather as a
set of possible worlds, the possible worlds compatible with what
is presupposed. (Italics mine.) This set, which I will call the
context set, is the set of possible worlds recognized by the
speaker to be the live options relevant to the conversation. A
proposition is presupposed if and only if it is true in ail of these
possible worlds. ...To engage in conversation is, essentially, to
distinguish among alternative possible ways that things might
be. The purpose of expressing propositions is to make such
distinctions. The presuppositions define the limits of the set of
alternative possibilities among which the speakers intend their
expressions of propositions to distinguish 11
.
These remarks heip to make clear the importance to Stalnaker of a
previously quoted statement that content is to be understood in terms of
possibilities excluded. Assertion is represented as selection of some proper
subset of the context set by the speaker; what is asserted is always true in
some but not all of the possible worlds in the context set” 12 . The use of a
sentence to express a proposition either true in every possible world in the
context set, or false in every such world, would select nothing, and would be
a pointless speech act. People do perform pointless acts sometimes, but no
theory about how language w'orks should exaggerate this unfortunate fact
That, however, is what the semantical rules, straightforwardly applied do
to such conversations as O'Leary's with Daniels. Hesperus, Mars and Venus
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all exist in every world in the context set of their conversation. If
Hesperus
,
Mars and Venus ' are all rigid designators in that context set.
as the independently plausible semantical rules ' say, then both O'Leary and
Daniels engage in pointless expression of necessary propositions when they
assert the sentences Hesperus is Mars and Hesperus is Venus . For the
former sentence then expresses a proposition false throughout the context
set, and the latter expresses a proposition true in every one of the context
set s members. Here we have an illustration of the clash to which Stalnaker
refers: the initial description of their conversation does not suggest that
what they are doing with those sentences is pointless, that they fail to make
any assertions, but some powerfully motivated semantical rules have the
opposite result when straightforwardly applied.
Stalnaker proposes a reconciliation. He begins by constructing what
he calls a propositional concept for O'Leary's use of the token "Hesperus is
Mars 1 1 locus on 0 Leary s assertion, since similar remarks will apply to
Daniels assertion.) The background for the construction begins with a fuller
description of O'Leary s presuppositions, of "what the world would be like if
what Oleary seems intuitively to be saying were true
There is a possible world (or class of possible worlds) which
resembles the actual world with respect to the way the heavens
appear to the untrained eye, but in which the solar system is
quite differently arranged. The solar system in this world has
the same planets as our world has, and they have the same
names. But in this counterfactual world, Mars appears in the
evening at the very place where Venus in fact appears, and it
has quite the same appearance it in fact has (at least to the
untrained eye). Ancient astronomers in this world called this
planet which appears in the evening (not knowing of course
that it was a planet) by a name from which descends the name
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Hesperus - a name used by the modern English speakers of
this counterfactual world to refer to that planet.
Now a man like O'Leary, who has the superficial knowledge of
the solar system that most of us have, and who is inclined
sometimes to misremember what he has read or heard might
well believe that a world like the one I have described is the
actual world. If he did believe this, he might express his belief
by saying Hesperus is Mars.'' And if he did say this, I think we
would all conclude that he was saying that the world was
something like the world I have described.
Call the actual world i and this other world (or some
representative from this class of worlds)
j..
Stalnaker then notes that 0 Leary s token of Hesperus is Mars exists
not only in i, the actual world, but also in j. (Its existence is something
presupposed.) In each of these situations, the token expresses a proposition
determined by a straightforward application of the aforementioned
semantical rules. But the proposition it expresses in
j
is different from the
proposition it expresses in i, because in j, unlike i, Hesperus and "Mars
both refer to Venus. Hence, as he utters it in j, Hesperus is Mars expresses
a proposition true in all the worlds in the context set, where Venus is




What is here represented is the propositional concept (or, more accurately, a
conveniently simplified stand-in) for O'Leary s utterance; this concept is a
function from possible worlds into propositions. The proposition that is
represented by the diagonal of this matrix is what Stalnaker calls the
diagonal proposition ' for the utterance. One way of specifying the diagonal
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is metalinguistically: it is a proposition true in a world just in case the
metalinguistic claim that the token in question expresses a truth is itself true
there (e.g., "Hesperus is Mars is true"). But metalinguistic reference to the
uttered token is not essential in specifying the diagonal. What is essential to
it are the possible worlds it contains; mention of the token is simply a
convenient way we may pick out those worlds. O'Leary, we may suppose,
intends to talk about certain astronomical facts, and not about astronomical
terms. In general, the diagonal (relative to a given propositional concept) is
the proposition true at world w, for each w in the context set, if and only if
the proposition expressed in w is true at w.
No reconciliation without diagonalization, Stalnaker suggests: When a
clash of the sort illustrated arises, the content of an assertion is the diagonal
proposition for it, and not the proposition yielded by straightforward
application of the semantical rules. Relative to each possible context of
utterance, those rules straightforwardly applied do yield the correct truth
conditions for the proposition expressed in that context; to this extent,
reconciliation is achieved. In the case of O'Leary, what he asserts, and what
Daniels understands him to say, is the proposition false at i, the actual world,
and true at j, the world as it seems to 0 Leary to be. If Daniels says, "No
0 Leary, Hesperus is not Mars" the propositional concept for his utterance of
Hesperus is not Mars ' is appropriately represented by a matrix like the one
above, but with "F" s and T "s interchanged; thus what he asserts is the
proposition true at i and false at j. No wonder they disagree, and pointedly
Although I have not reported all that Stainaker has to say in defense
of his views on the nature of assertion, it is clear from this partial report that
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his views have a powerful and plausible motivation. In order to make them
applicable to belief, let us pretend that to believe a proposition is to assert it
( perhaps silently) to oneself. Believing would then be having a degenerate
conversation, with speaker and audience the same. This is here a harmless
and helpful assumption, even if it ought not to be held in general. Given this
assumption, the context set for a belief will simply be the set of all possible
worlds compatible with what the believer believes. Even if Daniels had not
been around, and O'Leary had spoken only to himself, it would have been
plausible to describe 0 Leary s asserted belief in just the same way as above:
true at j, but lalse at i. Doesn't that say how O'Leary believes things are in
the sky' It seems that it does. Can we do as well for Smith and the Two
Tubes Puzzle? I will now describe a version of the puzzle that includes
persistence of belief, because this will provide the toughest test of
Stalnaker s view (as I indicate in Diagonalization and Demonstrative Belief'
,
below). We can then look at how best to apply diagonalization to that case.
The Persistence of the Puzzle
The experimental apparatus is as described in Chapter II, and so is
Smith: the apparatus consists of a large, opaque screen with two small eye-
holes in it; two tubes lead from the eye-holes and can be oriented in a large
number of directions to point at a uniformly red, uniformly illuminated
sheet of plastic in front of the screen. Smith is to look through the tubes and
to report what he sees while he focusses his eyes independently He knows
the set-up and knows that he does not know how the tubes are oriented
while he looks through them. At 1 1:59 a.m. on the day of the experiment,
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^>mith closes his left eye and looks through the right tube with his right eye
He says to himself,
( 1 ) this is red
asserting his belief about what he sees through his right eye. He continues
to look through the right tube with his right eye and persists in the belief he
expressed by ( 1 ) until 12:0
1 p.m., two minutes later. At noon, Smith opens
his left eye and looks through the left tube. He says to himself,
(2) that is red
asserting his belief about what he sees through his left eye. He continues to
look through the left tube with his left eye and persists in the belief he
expressed by (2) until 12:01 p.m., one minute later. Since Smith is an alert,
attentive and reflective individual using a perfectly functioning pair of
independently focussed eyes in ideal lighting conditions, we may also
suppose that he knows that he knows the propositions he expresses by ( 1
)
and by (2), and their conjunction. Smith is ignorant of the orientation of the
tubes, and knows that he is ignorant: so he wonders throughout the second
minute, 1 2:00 - 12:0
1 p.m.,
(3) Is this = that?
He neither believes nor disbelieves what he could express by tnis = that ", or
by this^that ". But he has no doubts about his beliefs expressed by ( 1 ) and
(2). Even though the sadistic supervising psychologist threatens Smith with
a fatal electric shock if he (Smith) attempts to report beliefs about how
things appear to him to be, rather than about how they are. Smith remains
persistent and confident in his beliefs - a wholly rational attitude, given the
optimum perceptual circumstances in which he knows himself to be. Of
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course, as in the original version of the puzzle, the tubes are in fact pointed
at the very same spot. And the puzzle is to say exactly what Smith s
persisting beliefs are in a way that accounts for his rationality and his
ignorance.
Diagonalization and Demonstrative Relief
The problem is to provide a plausible account of Smith s behef and
wondering when, (we may suppose) at noon, he says to himself, "this is red
and that is red, but is this - that?" The semantical rules, straightforwardly
applied, yield the unacceptable result that "this is red" and "that is red" both
express the same proposition, namely, the set of possible worlds in which the
object Smith actually sees has the property of being red. The rules also tell
us that Smith wonders if, and does not believe that, every world in the
context set is one in which the spot he actually sees is identical to itself.
(This is analogous to 0 Leary's failure to believe the proposition assigned by
the semantical rules to "Hesperus is Venus' .) But, by hypothesis, Smith is
not that dim-witted.
If we follow Stalnaker’s lead in the case of O'Leary (and in many other
examples he discusses; see notes), the proper use of diagonalization in the
Two Tubes Puzzle seems to be as follows: there are some situations in which
things look to Smith as they do in the actual world, but in which he sees two
visually indiscernible red spots. The propositional concept for the token "this





where o is the actual world, and t is a representative from the class of two-
spot worlds. In wondering, "Is this = that?'*, he wonders, in effect, if he is in
a one-spot or a two-spot world; or, to put it propositionally, he bears the
wondering relation to the diagonal proposition for the above propositional
concept. (Here it is crucial that we have assumed that among the worlds in
the context set - worlds "compatible with what Smith believes" - are some
two-spot worlds. More on this later.) The propositional concepts for "this is
red" and for "that is red" may be constructed as follows. The context set
consists of three (kinds of) worlds: (i) the actual world, o, in which Smith
accurately perceives the one red spot, S0 , with both eyes; (ii) a possible
world, 4, in which Smith misperceives as red a different, non-red spot, SR ,
with his right eye, and accurately sees S0 to be red with his left eye; (iii) a
possible world, t|, in which Smith misperceives as red a different, non-red
spot, SL , with his left eye (SL#SR , SL^S0 ), and accurately sees S0 to be red
with his right eye. The relevant matrices are:
0 V t| 0 V t,oTTT oTTT
V F F F tj T T T
t,T T T tj F F F
"this is red" "that is red"
The diagonal propositions agree at o, the actual world, but reverse truth-
values at tr and tj. In all three of these situations, however, things look
exactly the same to Smith. His wondering "Is this = that?" may also be
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represented using these three worlds. In o and t,. • this" refers to S0 . but in
tr , it refers to SR ; in o and tr , that" refers to S0 , but in t,, it refers to SL .
Smith wonders whether the world is actually the way it is in o, t
r or t,M.
(We could have included a fourth world in Smith s context set - one in which
he misperceives as red, and in the same way, two objects, distinct from each
other and from any actually seen by Smith, one object with each eye.
Because it is simpler to stick to the three-world set, I refrain from making
this equally plausible addition^.)
Let us call the result of applying diagonalization to "this is red" the
proposition Righty, a proposition true in just those worlds in which things
look to Smith through his right eye in the same way as they do in the actual
world, but which contains some worlds in which it is another spot that he
sees with his right eye; and let us call the result of applying diagonalization
to 'that is red" the proposition Lefty, true in just those worlds in which
things look to Smith through his left eye as they actually do, but which
contains some worlds where it is another spot he sees with his left eye.
When applied to this = that ”, diagonalization yields a proposition true in any
world in which he sees just one red spot with both eyes, and false in all two-
spot worlds. (If we include the fourth world, mentioned above, in the
context set, then the spots seen needn't be the one spot actually seen.) One
thing is clear about all three of these propositions: none of them is an
individual proposition about the spot Smith actually sees, for in none of the
worlds they contain is it just one spot that reappears. We have instead a set
of spots that are visually indiscernible for Smith, but distinct from one
another. Despite the fact that Smith appears to be in optimum circumstances
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for believing the semantically assigned individual propositions about the
spot, diagonalization makes a different assignment. (For anyone who denies
(A) of the statement of the puzzle (see beginning of this chapter), this is not
a disturbing result. But, as I indicate below, there are good reasons for
thinking that Stalnaker would accept (A).)
This result may seem attractive until one notices that during Smith s
first minute with the tubes (1 1:59 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.), when he begins to
believe this is red
, diagonalization is otiose. During that initial segment of
the puzzle, the straightforward application of the semantical rules seems to
get things exactly right; indeed the situation seems optimum for their doing
so. During the first minute, Smith looks straight at the red spot, and believes
(and knows that he knows) the proposition, SPOT, true in just those worlds in
which the very thing he actually sees (S0 ) has the property of being red. If
ever anyone can believe such a proposition - such an individual proposition -
Smith does. But SPOT is a different proposition from Righty, which is the
diagonal proposition for the token ( 1 ). In fact, SPOT is a subset of Righty, so
not only does Smith s belief in the individual proposition he expressed by ( 1
)
fail to persist on this way of describing his situation, he also comes to believe
less by trying to believe more. In his "knowing Less by knowing More", Carl
Ginet has provided at least a partial remedy for the counterintuitiveness of
the phenomenon his title describes 16. But the remedy depends crucially on
observing that it is possible for evidence that previously justified a belief to
cease to do so in changed circumstances. No such remedy appears to be
available for the case of belief 17 . Smith s beliefs are, as the puzzle is
described, both known and justified, but the case would be a paradigm of
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Bersistence even if those assumptions were dronnsri If Stalnalcer s view
teaches us how to believe less by believing more, then it seems to teach us a
falsehood.
To emphasize a related apparent defect of this application of
diagonalization, we may observe that during the second minute, when it is
diagonal propositions that Smith is said to believe, his beliefs are simply
about how things appear to him to be. He therefore deserves the fatal
electric shock with which the sadistic psychologist threatened him.
Diagonalization can kill. Had Smith had his wits about him, he should have
refused to participate in the experiment, given the conditions laid down by
the psychologist: on Stalnaker's view, those conditions force Smith to attempt
to do the impossible. But isn't all this plain wrong? I think so.
Can Stalnaker avoid these untoward results? There are just three
ways for Stalnaker to secure persistence of Smith s beliefs that seem even
remotely plausible. I argue neit that none of them will do.
Eve Got Here First
First, one might apply diagonalization only to tokens in which "that"
occurs, leave "this is red" alone, and thus secure persistence. Doing that
seems wrong, however, in view of the obvious symmetry of the example:
Smith s perceptual contact through each eye with the spot is exactly similar,
his attitudes are parallel, and his wondering is symmetrical (As he might
most clearly put it, "I wonder if this - that and I wonder if that - this.")
Why should the fact that Smith happened to open his right eye first yield a
special exemption for "this"? It shouldn't.
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A more sophisticated variant of this strategy, which avoids the
linguistic exemption, is as follows. The context set, C,, for "this is red" during
the first minute contains only worlds in which the very spot actually seen
has the property of being red. At the beginning of the second minute,
however, the context set enlarges, and there are suddenly new possibilities
that are relevant to determining Smith s belief. In all the the worlds in this
new set, C2 , the object that Smith perceives accurately with his right eye is
the same as the one he actually perceives; but in some of them, the object
that he perceives with his left eye is different from the one that he actually
perceives. When diagonalization is applied, the diagonal proposition for "this
is red is the individual proposition containing those worlds in which the
very spot actually seen has the property of redness. So that belief persists,
nearly enough. But the diagonal proposition for "that is red" contains some
worlds in which a different spot appears red to Smith, and so is not an
individual proposition. The effect for Smith's wondering may be described
in this way: when Smith wonders, "Is this - that?", he wonders, "Is this very
thing identical to the thing that appears to me to be on the left?"
This more sophisticated version of the first strategy does secure
persistence, and does not arbitrarily restrict the application of
diagonalization to selected tokens. But it, too, fails to respect the symmetry
of Smith s situation; and it does not save him from the fatal electric shock,
because his left-eye belief is simply about how things appear to him to be
through his left eye. For these reasons, I am inclined to think that it is
merely more sophisticated than the first version of this strategy. Even if we
agree that some sort of doxastically important change takes place in Smith at
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the beginning of the second minute, this strategy seems to misdescribe the
change.
[There is an analogy, worth investigating, between Stacker's views
on the identity of beliefs and Shoemaker's views on the identity of believers.
As I interpret his view, Stalnaker is committed to saying that Smith's belief
in the individual proposition expressed by his use of ( 1 ) does not persist,
though he is able consistently to hold that if Smith had not acquired his
belief (2), through his left eye, he would have persisted in his belief ( 1 ). The
merely possible existence of a competitor' to ( 1 ) is not enough to defeat the
belief, though the actual occurrence of a competitor' (i.e., (2)) does defeat it.
In a recent essay, 18 Shoemaker defends a psychological continuity analysis
of personal identity. In replying to what he takes to be the toughest
counterexamples to his view - those involving duplication - he writes as
follows:
The recognition that our conception of personal identity has this
parochial element - that the way personal identity is in fact
realized in us is given a privileged status - is compatible with
the claim that where the BST-device (Shoemaker's name for a
Brain State Transfer duplication machine] functions properly its
operation is person-preserving. But to reconcile these we need
to modify the non-branching provision of the psychological
continuity theory into something like Robert Nozick's closest
continuer theory'. In cases of equal branching we can say, as I
said earlier about branching in general, that neither offshoot'
counts as identical to the original person. In cases of unequal
branching, the offshoot that is the closest continuer' of the
original person counts as identical to him. There will be various
dimensions of closeness'. The one that concerns us here might
be called the dimension of aptness of causal mechanism'. In
our example, one can hold that if the BST-device functions
properly then the closest continuer of Smith is the post-transfer
B-brain person, while allowing that if it misfunctions in the way
imagined the closest continuer is the post-transfer A-brain
person 1 *.
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The obvious similarities in verbal formulation might gain depth in
examination of the relationship between the identity of believers and the
identity of their beliefs (and other propositional attitudes); because, in a
sense Shoemaker attempts to explain, the latter consititues the former on his
view, the relationship is not accidental. Location of the exact place in
Stainaker’s and Shoemaker s views on these matters of a functionalist theory
of mind would also deepen the analogy. A choice between the non-
persistence application of diagonalization and the more sophisticated
persistence strategy suggested in this section might even be based on
identification of the relevant dimensions of closeness of continuity of one
belief to a given belief; the dimensions will have to include more than just
those facts about how the belief was caused by circumstances eiternai to the
believer, or about the identity of the causing object - functional role in the
believer’s mental life will be crucial, too. But I leave all these ideas as
matters for further investigation on another occasion. I think that they are
interesting enough to deserve a place in the record now.J
Believing Too Much bv Believing More
A second way in which both persistence of belief and a kind of
symmetry might be secured is this. One might apply diagonalization just to
"this - that ”, but not to either "this is red" or "that is red”, even during the
second minute. The latter two would then express the same individual
proposition at all times Smith entertained them, but "this - that" would not
express an individual proposition about the spot actually seen at all 21 .
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In addition to seeming wholly adJioc, this strategy cannot handle a
slightly augmented version of the current puzzle. Let us add to the case as
described by stipulating that Smith also believes throughout the two-minute
period what he could express by
(4) this is the object that appears to me to be on the right
and that he believes, beginning at noon, what he could express by
(5) that is the object that appears to me to be on the left;
suppose also that he believes their conjunction together with all his
previously mentioned beliefs. (We could just as well have supposed that the
definite descriptions in (4) and (5) were "the object I dub this " and "the
object I dub that
, or any other accurate definite description plausibly at
Smith s disposal.) Unless we apply diagonalization to these additional tokens,
Smith will, given his postulated more-than-minimal logical powers, turn out
already to believe this = that". Withholding diagonalization from (4) and (5)
has the consequence that, so to speak, the same object appears twice over in
the individual propositions they express. The intersection of these two sets
of worlds (i.e., their conjunction, which Smith believes) will be a set of
worlds in which one and the same object appears to him through both eyes.
Hence, he will thereby believe what he could express by "this is the object
that appears to me to be on the left and that is the object that appears to me
to be on the right". Smith will, given his stipulated more-than -minimal
logical powers, conclude what he could express by "this = that". But he
clearly could have these additional beliefs, and a great deal more definite
descriptive' knowledge of the spot he sees, without ceasing to wonder “Is
this = that?" The second strategy fails.
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Diagonalizing Everywhere
A third strategy for securing persistence (and symmetry) is to apply
diagonaiization to "this is red" even during the first minute. Thus, even from
the first, Smith s belief is not in an individual proposition about the spot he
sees (not in SPOT), but rather about how some spot appears to him (-the
context set contains worlds with lots of visually indiscernible, or visually
undiscerned, spots).
Given that during the first minute Smith is in apparently "clash-free"
circumstances, this strategy is tantamount to applying diagonaiization to
every use of a proper name, indexical or demonstrative. Not only does this
seem wrong, it also seems to be in conflict with what Stalnaker holds. (Most
obviously, it makes the introduction of diagonaiization into a tool for
rejection of those oft- mentioned independently plausible semantical rules,
instead of a tool for reconciliation.) In a footnote
,
22 he remarks,
...lam not proposing the hypothesis that in general x believes
P is true if and only if x believes the diagonal proposition
of the propositional concept for the expression that o .
And in his discussion of Lewis' Two Gods Case
,
23 Stalnaker grants that the
deities involved can believe propositions that distinguish between
qualitatively indiscernible situations (by believing propositions that contain
some but not all members of a class of qualitatively indiscernible worlds). I
trust that he does not wish to hold that only a deity has such doxastic power.
For, no matter how much purely qualitative, definite descriptive' knowledge
Smith might have of the spot, he might subsequently discover the individual
proposition he could express by,
"
this is the object that is the F and the G
Ill
and...". I assume, therefore, that Stalnaker will grant that those who, like
Smith, are less than divine, can believe a proposition that distinguishes a
situation where there is a particular thing that is believed by the believer to
be red from ones where visually similar things are believed by the believer
to be red.
Although 1 know of nothing that Stalnaker says that is flatly
inconsistent with this third strategy, the preceding textual evidence shows
that it is not in the spirit of his view. Hence, it would appear after all that if
we accept Stalnaker's approach to the puzzle, we will have to give up on a
paradigm of persistence of belief and admit the possibility of believing less
by believing more.
Interpretive Doubts: The Iceman Cometh
At the beginning of this chapter, I registered some doubts about the
accuracy of the interpretation I would present of Stalnaker's views. I have
now presented that interpretation, and I want to indicate the source of my
doubts. There are some things that Stalnaker says in presenting his views in
"Indexical Belief" that are very difficult to accommodate on my
interpretation, and I would be less than honest if I did not alert the reader
to them. I find in these things Stalnaker says a view that is different from,
and more interestingly extreme, than the one I attribute to him.
The first hint of trouble - and it is only a hint - comes when Stalnaker
writes,
I doubt that it is plausible to believe that there is,
independently of context, a well defined domain of absolutely
1 12
maximally specific possible states of the world, but I do not
think the proposed conception of propositional content requires
a commitment to such a domain24 .
By itself, this remark causes no trouble for my interpretation, because I have
throughout dealt with filed contexts. A few pages later, the eiegetical
situation becomes murkier:
Consider an example which, unlike the ones we have been
discussing, is relatively unproblematic. I believe that Daniels
was once an iceman in Chicago. My belief is, I think it is
reasonable to say, really about Daniels; 1 know him fairly well,
an am not inclined to confuse him with anyone else. Others
might correctly ascribe this belief to me by referring to Daniels
himself ("See that bald guy talking to the tall woman by the
bar? Stalnaker believes that he was once an iceman in
Chicago. ) The reason that my belief can be ascribed in this way
is that in each of the possible situations which define my state
of belief, the very same person - Daniels himself - is a former
Chicago iceman. But what, we might ask, is it about my state of
mind which makes it correct to identify that person with our
Daniels? Why is that person Daniels rather than someone else
with the same name and similar characteristics?2?
The question is a large and difficult one, but it is easy to point
in a general way to the kind of considerations that should go
into an answer. My belief is about Daniels partly because of the
role which Daniels played in causing my state of mind to have
the character which it has, and partly because the actions which
my beliefs dispose me to perform are actions which involve
Daniels. If Daniels had looked different, or had done different
things, then the former Chicago iceman in the possible situations
which define my state of belief would have been different in
corresponding ways. And when 1 meet Daniels at an APA
meeting, my behavior towards him can be explained in part in
terms of the characteristics which the former Chicago iceman
has in the possible situations which define my beliefs. That is
why he is Daniels26 .
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In the first paragraph quoted, from page 1 40, StalnaJcer tells us that he
believes the proposition expressed by
(6) Daniels was once an iceman in Chicago.
He also tells us very clearly that the proposition expressed by (6) is a set of
possible situations in which Daniels himself exists, and has the property of
being a former Chicago iceman. In other words. (6) expresses an individual
proposition about Daniels. But Stainalter then goes on to ask, "What is it
about my state of mind which makes it correct to identify that person with
our Daniels, and not just someone a lot like him?" If "that person" rigidly
designates Daniels himself, as it seems to do, then the question may seem
pointless, for it may seem equivalent to asking, "Why is that person Daniels?"
The answer to that question has already been given; it is simply, "Because
that person is Daniels." But Stalnaker makes it clear (pages 140-141) that
he is not asking this pointless question. Rather, he means to focus on the
pan of the question, "what is it about mv state of mind ?” That is, he means
to be asking, about such relatively unproblematic cases, what kind of
relation the believer must bear to an object in order that the believer be
able, slipulalively, to put the object itself into the counterfactual situations
contained in the belief; or, to put it in terms 1 have used in other chapters,
what is it about the believer s relation to the object that makes the latter a
constituent of the proposition believed? Russell’s answer was, "the believer
must be acquainted with the object". Stalnaker’s answer is of a different
kind, and the partial answer he gives us is contained in the second
paragraph quoted above, from page 141. What he says there may be put in
this way:
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If we examine Stalnaker's mental state characterized by his belief in
the proposition expressed by (6) (his head state, to put it crudely and
materialistically), we find that the proposition is a subset of a set of possible
situations in every one of which some individual occurs who has all the
properties that Stalnaker believes Daniels to have, and who has, therefore,
the property of being a former Chicago iceman. It is correct to exclude from
the proposition Stalnaker expresses by (6) all those situations in which
individuals merely similar to Daniels occur only if the belief in question
meets two conditions: (a) Daniels himself played a causal role (of a kind
Stalnaker does not elucidate, but of which there are many tolerably clear
examples - seeing Daniels provides one, Smith s seeing the red spot during
the first minute provides another) in causing Stalnaker to believe what (6)
expresses; and (b) his believing that proposition disposes Stalnaker to
perform certain actions which involve Daniels. An action will involve Daniels
only if it is Daniels himself who is acted on, or would then be acted on, and
not merely someone qualitatively similar to him 27 . In a case where (a) and
(b) hold, let us say that there is a "reciprocal causal relationship ' between
the believer and the thing about which he has the belief. It is the actual
obtaining of such a reciprocal causal relationship that brings it about that the
individual who occurs in the possible situations in (6) is Daniels. Because he
bears that relationship to Daniels in the circumstances described, Stalnaker
can stipulatively put Daniels into all of those possible situations ("he s the
guy I mean").
That there is a reciprocal causal relationship between Stalnaker and
Daniels (or between Smith and the red spot) is a contingent fact. If there
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were a Daniels-twin (Danielsganger), alike in imagined characteristics and
causal powers, then the relationship will not obtain if it would not be the
case that Daniels himself causes Stalnaker to have his belief or if it would not
be the case that Stalnaker's dispositions to action involve Daniels. In such a
situation, different from the relatively unproblematic'' one Stalnaker takes
himself be describing, the proposition he would believe and would express
by asserting (6) is not an individual proposition, for it is not the case that
Daniels exists in every situation in it - Danielsgangers will sometimes appear
instead. Unfortunately, this gives us little or no help with the Two Tubes
Puzzle, because it seems clear (to me, anyway) that if there is a reciprocal
causal relationship between Daniels and Stalnaker in the relatively
unproblematic, Danielsganger-free case, then there is also such a relationship
between Smith and the spot, irrespective of whether he thinks of it using
this or that . (The only way to escape this result seems to be to interpret
'involves'' in (b), above so that qualitatively indiscernible individuals may be
substituted, and that ruins Stalnaker's explanation of the aboutness of (6).)
Here is what Stalnaker gives us, immediately following the last paragraph
quoted, about the possibility of twins:
Now however this kind of answer is filled out, it would be
highly implausible to expect that there should always be a nice
one-one correspondence between certain individuals in the
actual world and those who inhabit the possible worlds which
define a state of belief. As Bernard
J. Ortcutt taught us long ago,
one and the same actual person may be responsible for the
existence and character of two distinct individuals in the
possible situations which define some state of belief. And
equally well, two distinct actual individuals may merge
together in someone's mental representation of the world. In
these cases, questions such as "which individual in the belief
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world is the real Ortcutt? may have no determinate answer. In
cases where two individuals in a possible situation have equal
claim to be indentified with an individual in the actual world
(or the reverse) how the identification is made may depend
more on the context of belief ascription than it does on the
character of the belief state itself.
In the world as Lingens (-the believer in a puzzle case like that
of Perrys Augmented Messy Shopper) thinks it might be, there
are two individuals both of whom are appropriately related to
Lingens. Each one would be said to be Lingens if it weren't for
the other. It does not really matter, I think, which we say is the
real Lingens. If I had described the case differently...then the
propositional concept...would have been different.... But the
diagonal proposition of the propositional concept...would have
distinguished between the situations. ..in exactly the same
way28 .
The kind of indeterminacy of the identity of individuals discussed in the long
passage just quoted may be consistent with the kind expressed in the
passage from page 135, quoted at the beginning of this section. But it is not
consistent with the interpretation I have presented of how Stalnaker might
best apply diagonalization to resolution of the Two Tubes Puzzle. There I
assumed that it was wholly determinate which relevant individuals were
which. What we need most here is Stalnaker's version of the lesson of
Bernard
J. Ortcutt. We haven't got it, and it is not at all clear how to fill in the
gap29 . (Unlike Hintikka, Stalnaker sees that there is a gap to be filled-in. See
the last section of this chapter.) It is because there are these passages in
Indexicai Belief" which I am hard-pressed to understand, and this crucial
gap which I am unable to fill in, that I am less than wholly confident of my
interpretation of Stalnaker's views. There may be important subtleties that
I have missed. Q.E.D.
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An Unacceptable Countering it ivpn^g?
Even supposing that my interpretation of Stalnaker's view does it
justice, does what I have said here refute the approach I have attributed to
him? I think not. There is even a certain naturalness to the rejection of
persistence and of (B) when the Two Tubes Puzzle is presented from the
point of view of that approach. There is after all, an important change that
occurs at the beginning of the second minute, and it is not implausibly
described as a loss of (or reduction in) doxastic power on Smith's part. New
possibilities become relevant at noon, and he is limited in his ability to
distinguish among them - as we might say in sympathy with the approach.
One's sympathy might be increased by consideration of Stalnaker's
description of the nature of his approach:
I will approach the question (of deciding what the believer
believes in puzzle cases) holistically. That is, I will not begin by
looking at sentences which express or ascribe the belief and ask
what proposition seems to be determined by the semantical
rules for such sentences. Instead I will ask what alternative
possible situations seem, according to the story as a whole, to be
compatible with the agent’s beliefs. If we can get a plausible
answer to the this question, then we can turn to the different
question about the means by which that proposition was
expressed or ascribed. We can ask, how is it that the sentences
used to express and ascribe the belief are able to express and
ascribe that belief30 .
As we have already seen, a very great deal depends on just how the phrase
alternative possible situations compatible with the agent's belief'' is
interpreted. I have pressed the intuition that no situation in which the very
spot he sees fails to exist and be seen by him is a situation "compatible with
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Smith's beliefs" expressed with his uses of "this" or "that" (i.e., ( 1 ) - (5),
above). But Stalnaker's holistic approach leads him to recommend
overruling this intuition where I have pressed it. Stalnaker sees the
possibility of "interference" between beliefs, and when it actually occurs
(when, for example, either condition (a) or (b) of the last section fails to
hold), "superposition" of certain propositions will not be possible; defeat of
the original belief may occur instead*!. To some, this will seem like
intentional action at a distance"*2 . The holistically inclined will not measure
distance so traditionally**.
Besides, as David Lewis has suggested, philosophical theories are
hardly ever refuted conclusively. Instead, as Lewis says,
...what we accomplish in philosophical argument: we measure
the price....But when all is said and done...we still face the
question which prices are worth paying, which are the
unacceptably counterintuitve consequences and which are the
acceptably counterintuitive ones*4 .
I am prepared, even hope, to be convinced that Stalnaker's approach has
only acceptably counterintuitive consequences. In light of my criticisms,
however, I hope that Stalnaker will understand if I hold my sympathy in
check and continue to shop for a cheaper alternative while I wait to be
convinced. I'm not sure that he can get it for us wholesale. I do not see any
hope of doing better for the traditional analysis of belief as a two-term
relation between a believer and a proposition. So in the next chapter, I turn
to consideration of views that abandon that traditional dyadic propositional
analysis: the self- attribution views of Chisholm and Lewis, and the triadic
views of Kaplan and Richard. I will argue that Chisholm and Lewis have just
as much, and as little, to offer as Schiffer, because their views are little more
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than notational variants of one another. Kaplan s view (in Demnnsirativ*.)
is, on one characterization he gives of character", unable to resolve the Two
Tubes Puzzle; and on another characterization, too vague to be of any use.
Richard gives us precision and clarity where Kaplan is vague, but his view is
open to a non-persistence objection much like the one of the present chapter.
Stalnaker and Hintikka on Propositional Identity
Those who, like Stalnaker and Hintikka, analyse belief as a relation
between a believer and a set of possible worlds, face a serious problem in
accounting for mathematical ignorance (and ignorance of other necessary
subject matter). Although this problem is not directly relevant to the Two
Tubes Puzzle - in fact, nothing in the proposed resolution depends on the
members of the propositions' being individuated as possible worlds are35 - it
is so notorious that it is worth mentioning it as an additional problem for the
approach that Stalnaker takes. I want also to point out that the best
Hintikka has to offer us in solution is troubled by the Two Tubes Puzzle
itself.
The problem arises in this way. In general, if the proposition
expressed by some use of a sentence is simply the set of possible worlds in
which that sentence is true, then logically equivalent propositions will be
identical. A necessary truth, such as is expressed by "2+2=4", is true in
every possible world. That is to say, the proposition expressed by this
arithmetical sentence is the set of all possible worlds. But the same is true of
any other necessary truth. So there is just one necessary truth, according to
Stalnaker (and similarly, there is just one necessary falsehood). But this
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makes it very hard to account for the eiistence of Departments of
Mathematics at universities: if we learn the necessary truth in elementary
school, what point is there to further study of mathematics? We already
know all there is to know of it when we have learned our first sum(s). In
order to avoid this preposterous result. Stalnaker once suggested that
mathematical knowledge is essentially linguistic:
There are only two mathematical propositions, the necessarily
true one and the necessarily false one. and all we know is that
the first is true and the second is false. But the functions that
determine which of the two propositions is expressed by a
given mathematical statement are just the kind that are
sufficiently complex to give rise to reasonable doubt about
which proposition is expressed by a statement. Hence it seems
reasonable to take the objects of belief and doubt in
mathematics to be propositions about the relations between
statements and what they say36
Anyone who holds that mathematics is essentially about the structure of
certain necessary truths will want to reject this view, but we needn't go so
deep to find a reason for rejecting Stalnaker s proposal. As has been pointed
out by Lawrence Powers37 and Hartry FieJd^, this proposal seems simply
not to work. Here is Stalnaker s own rendering of the relevant objection:
...consider a particular axiomatic formulation of first order logic
with which, suppose, I am familiar. While it is a contingent fact
that each axiom sentence expresses a necessary truth (however
the descriptive terms are interpreted), this is a contingent fact
which 1 know to be a fact. It may also be only contingently true
that the rules of inference of the system when applied to
sentences which express necessary truths always yield
sentences which express necessary truths, but this fact too is
known to me. Now consider any sentence of the system in
question which happens to be a theorem. Jt is only a contingent
truth that that sentence expresses a necessary truth, but this
contingent proposition follows deductively from propositions
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that! know to be true. Hence if my knowledge is deductively
dosed, as seems to be implied by the conception of states of
knowledge and belief that I have been defending, it follows that
1 know of every theorem sentence of the system in question
that it expresses a necessary truth. But of course I know no
such things.
Stalnaker s own most recent attempt to resolve this problem is in his
Infinity, I leave evaluation of that attempt for another occasion.
We will not find a solution in "Impossible Possible Worlds
Vindicated 40 where Hintikka gives his own most recent proposal. Hintikka
notes that the possible worlds approach to propositions seems committed to
the validity of such inferences as
(I) p —> a
Kp ~> Kq
and
(II) p --> q
Bp —> Bq
That is, if p logically implies q, then whoever knows or believes p, also
knows or believes q. Hintikka calls this "the problem of logical omniscience",
and continues:
...1 have in effect shown how to restrict the rules (I) and (II) in
an interesting way. The main idea underlying these restrictions
is that (I)-(ll) are valid only when q can be deduced from p
without considering more individuals than are considered in
either of them41 .
Hintikka makes it clear that his p s and q s here are sentences, and indicates
that the real work in giving his proposal comes in making model-
theoretically precise the "highly intuitive" idea of a "the number of
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individuals considered in their relation to one another in a given sentence".
But the Two Tubes Puzzle seems to provide a troublesome case for any such
proposal. Just let p - "this - this" and q - "this - that", as Smith uses those
sentences. Hintikka's proposal will entail that if Smith knows the one then he
knows the other, since they "consider the same individuals". But this
inference is one that should be blocked, not guaranteed.
One might reply that what is needed here is some device like
diagonalization to introduce different perceptual objects (perhaps visual
images) for the demonstratives to consider. Hintikka’s proposal about the
trans-world identification of perceptual objects occurs in Chapter 4 of his
The Intentions of Intentionalitv and Other New Models for Modalities^
entitled, "Information, Causality, and the Logic of Perception". On page 73,
he writes, "According to my lights, ...[a perceptually individuated individual)
equals an actual-world object M if and only if it is caused by M, ..." In the
Two Tubes Puzzle, this has the result that same "perceptually individuated
individual is perceived by Smith with each eye. This suggestion does not
yield the diversity of individuals that Hintikka needs to give his resolution of
the problem of logical omniscience a chance of succeeding. I am aware of no
mure successiui, published proposal by Hintikka on this matter.
In "Continuity and Similarity in Cross- Identification" 43
,
Esa Saarinen
insists (pages 203 - 207) that known spatio-temporal continuity of an object
should be given considerable weight in trans-world identification of objects
of belief. This might provide a rationale for the sophisticated version of the
first strategy for securing persistence44 . But Saarinen s remarks are, by his
own admission, sketchy, and it is not clear how to apply them, or why the
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fact that Smith continuously tracks the red spot with his right eye should be
given such weight in determining the identity of his belief.
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CHAPTER VI
TWO NON-TRADITIONAL ANALYSES OF BELIEF:
SELF-ATTRIBUTION AND CHARACTER
In the preceding five chapters, I have investigated how the Two Tubes
Puzzle and related puzzles about belief might be resolved while retaining the
assumption that belief is a two-termed relation between a believer and a
proposition. The Two Tubes Puzzle makes explicit use of that assumption
(see (A) - (D) of Chapter II). Several philosophers have recently suggested
that such puzzles about belief are best resolved if we abandon that
assumption, and in this chapter, I will examine the views of four such
philosophers. First, I discuss the views of Chisholm and Lewis, who hold that
belief is a relation, which we can call "self- attribution ", between a believer
and a purely qualitative property. Although it is presented as an alternative
to the traditional dyadic analysis of belief, I note that it is little more than a
notational variant of Schiffer's view, which denies (A) of the puzzle. If I am
right about this, then these views are open to all the same objections that I
made against Schiffer's view. Then I turn to discussion of triadic analyses of
belief, proposed by Kaplan and Richard. They hold, to put it roughly, that in
addition to propositions believed, there are also ways of believing them, and
that these ways must be used in resolving the puzzle. The limitations of
Kaplan's view are noted in order to motivate consideration of Richard s more
nearly satisfactory account. In the last section of the chapter, I find that
Richard's view is open to a version of the "lack of persistence" objection I
made against Stalnaker's view in Chapter V; although Richard's view will
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allow us to describe Smith as believing the same proposition throughout the
two minutes, it prevents that proposition, even when thought and expressed
in the same way ( this is this"), from being believed in the same way.
Chisholm: All Belief is Self-Attributive
Prompted by consideration of examples such as Perry s Messy
Shopper (see Chapter II), Chisholm and Lewis have proposed that we
abandon the traditional analysis of belief as a relation between a believer
and a proposition. They recommend instead that all belief is to be analyzed
as self- attribution of a purely qualitative property, because, as Lewis puts it,
"...sometimes property objects will do and propositional objects wonfi. I
have already said (in Chapter I) all that I can say briefly to clarify the notion
of a purely qualitative property. We need now to look at how the notion of
self-attribution is supposed to work to resolve the familiar puzzles. I will
concentrate initially on Chisholm s presentation since it is somewhat clearer,
simpler and more explicit on issues of importance here.
Suppose then that Perry has made his discovery, and is just about to
clean up. He has discovered what he expresses by uttering
( 1 ) I am making a mess
or what we might express by saying about him
(2) Perry believes that he himself is making a mess
where the "he himself" locution is meant to indicate and emphasize the
relevant difference between Perry's believing merely what he expressed by
"he is making a mess" and his discovery. Chisholm suggests that we analyze
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(2) as meaning that Perry self-attributes the purely qualitative property of
being a mess-maker (but see below for a qualification on tense and time).
Or, to put it as Chisholm does2
(D1 ) x believes that he himself is F = Df. The property of being F
is such that x directly attributes it to x.
where, Chisholm also stipulates, the following two principles are conceptual
truths about direct attribution:
(PI) For every x, every y and every z, if i directly attributes z
to y, then x is identical with y
(P2) For every x, every y and every z, if x directly attributes z
to y, then z is a property.
(PI ) is especially important here since it helps to make it clear that direct
attribution is a new and primitive notion, aptly called "self-attribution".
(Both Chisholm and Lewis are explicit about their intention to introduce a
new and primitive notion to solve the Perry puzzle. See especially The First
PgfSQP, page 32, paragraph 3 ) Since it is introduced in this way to solve the
puzzle, it is bound to succeed, if the notion it uses is intelligible. Because I
note below that these self-attributive views are isomorphic’ to one
propositional view, I need not discuss the question of intelligibiity.
Given the method of its introduction, "direct attribution" will run into
problems, if at all, in accounting for other sorts of puzzles - ones, like the
Two Tubes Puzzle, in which it appears that a property is directly’ attributed
to something other than the believer himself. If (PI) governs direct
attribution, then this must be mere appearance. Here is what Chisholm says
about the general question:
How does one succeed in making other things one's intentional
objects? In other words, how is it possible to refer to
individuals other than oneself?
For example, how do I make you my intentional object? I
would say that the answer is this: I make you my object by
attributing a certain property to myself. The property is one
which, in some sense, singles you out and thus makes you the
object of an indirect attribution. What would it be, then, for one
of my properties to single you out?
The answer involves two points:
( 1 ) There is a certain relation R which is such that you are the
thing to which I bear R. I shall say that such a relation is an
identifying relation - a relation by means of which the believer
singles out the object of his indirect attribution. Thus you might
be the person with whom I am talking, or the person I live
across the street from, or the person I am sitting next to....
(2) The property I directly attribute to myself may be said to
imply that there is just one thing to which I bear R and that
that thing has the property of being F. That is to say, the
property is necessarily such that whatever has it bears R to just
one thing and to a thing that is F.
When this situation obtains, I directly attribute to you the
property of being F3.
The answer is summarized in a pair of definitions4 :
(D2) y is such that, as the thing x bears R to, x indirectly
attributes to it the property of being F = Df. x bears R to y and
only to y; and x directly attributes to x a property which entails
the property of bearing R to just one thing and to a thing that is
F.
(D3) y is such that x indirectly attributes to it the property of
being F = Df. There is a relation R such that x indirectly
attributes to y, as the thing to which x bears R, the property of
being F.
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[The notion of property entaiiment used here is defined by Chisholm: One
property or relation is said to entail another provided that the first is
necessarily such that if it is exemplified then the second is exemplified, and
whoever conceives it conceives the second.] Chisholm comments:
According to this proposal, then, whenever a person indirectly
attributes a property to a thing, he can specify a certain
identifying relation R which is such that the thing in question is
the thing to which he bears R. This is not difficult to do5.
Before we can apply Chisholm s proposal to the Two Tubes Puzzle, we
need also to see what he says about belief expressed using demonstratives
and about perceptual belief, since the Two Tubes Puzzle is a case of both.
The closest that Chisholm comes to explicating the relevant use of '’this'’ (or
’•that") is:
This thing is F’ is used in English to express the following
property of its utterer: believing himself to be such that the
thing he is calling attention to is F6 .
In the case where the utterer and the listener are the same, the property
thus seems to be expressible by "believing myself to be such that the thing
to which I am attending is F”. I should now point out that Chisholm takes
the ""is" in the latter phrase to be tensed and short for "is now ", so that
insertion of ‘’now'* would be redundant7 . Although Chisholm defines times to
be certain states of affairs8
, he says that "...we must take tense seriously"9 ,
and makes it clear that he believes it to be basic in much the same way as he
takes the function of "I" to be. His explication of one use of demonstratives
is therefore virtually the same as the one that Schiffer offers for use in
"tough cases" (see Chapter 111, "Pay Attention"). Because the Two Tubes
Puzzle has Smith attend simultaneously through each eye to the spot he sees,
132
this explication of this (and "that") will not be useful in resolving the
puzzle. We need something more fine-grained that distinguishes between
ways of being appeared to; so we need to see what Chisholm says about
perceptual belief.
Since perceptual belief is, in the Two Tubes Puzzle, belief apparently
about something other than the believer, it must, according to Chisholm s
view, involve a self- attributed identifying relation between Smith and the
spot he sees.
The identifying relation that is involved in perception
pertains...to the concept of appearing . If I perceive a thing, then
I judge that there is just one thing that is appearing to me in a
certain way. I may judge, for example, that something appears
red to me. If many things are such that each one is appearing
red to me, then for each of them there will be a further way of
appearing which is such that that thing is the sole thing that is
appearing to me in that way. One thing might appear red and
round, another red and square, and so on 10 .
In accord with these claims, Chisholm offers
(1) The property of being F is such that x perceptually takes y
to have it =Df. There is a way of appearing such that y and only
y appears in that way to x; and the property of being F is a
sensible property that x indirectly attributes to y, as the thing
that appears to him in that way.
In some situations, Smith s among them, the believer will also enjoy a
veridical perception which he knows to be veridical. In such situations,
Chisholm describes the believer as having identified the thing as the thing
that appears to him in the way it does. Chisholm observes 1
1
that it is
possible, and indeed extremely common, for a believer to identify something
in more than one way, and to fail to realize that it is one and the same thing
identified in two or more ways. As some writers have put it, a believer may
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have belief or knowledge about an object under (two different)
descriptions and yet fail to realize that the object reappears in those two
guises. Using the notion of indirect attribution, Chisholm defines:









irecllY attributes the property of being F =
Pf:
There is a relation R which is such that x indirectly
' as 10 which he bears R, the property ofh there is a relation S which is such that x indirectlv
attributes to y as the thing to which he bears S, the property of
being F; (111) x knows himself to bear R and S to the same thing
and (lv) x s evidence for believing that he bears R to just one
’
thing is independent of his evidence for believing that he bears
S to just one thing.
Consideration of (D4) yields Chisholm s account of precisely what Smith has
not yet done when he thinks to himself, "this is red and that is red, but is
this = that? : Smith identifies the spot he sees under the description "the
thing that (now ) appears to me to be on the right and under the description
the thing that (now) appears to me to be on the left", but fails to realize that
it is the same thing so identified by him. When Smith thinks to himself, "this
is red
, he indirectly attributes to the spot, as the thing to which he bears the
identifying relation of being the thing which appears to him (himself) to be
on the right, the property of being red (-and similarly for that is red").
Despite the considerable syntactical complexity of many of Chisholm s
definitions and locutions (caused by the indirectness of many attributions), it
is relatively clear that he has provided a translation of a description theory
of singular terms (save for I" and the present tense) into the terminology of
self- attribution. Except for a relatively slight difference over the use and
function of "now", Chisholm s view seems indiscernible from Schiffer s.
There seems nothing to stop him from defining "S believes the individual
proposition <S, F>" as: S directly attributes F to S. If "taking tense seriously”
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were explicitly incorporated into the translation, Schiffer could then define
S directly attributes being F now to S' as: S believes the individual
proposition <S, being F at t>»2 where t is the time of the believing. In cases
of indirect attribution, Schiffer can understand the beliefs in question as
beliefs expressible using a definite description which indicates the
identifying relation among believer, object and time of belief. The
resolutions that each offers to the Two Tubes Puzzle provide precisely
parallel examples of such indirectness of belief
,
via what is expressible by
indexical definite descriptions. If ever there were a case of mere
terminological difference between two philosophers, this is it.
[Chisholm himself comes very close to conceding the alleged
isomorphism. In "Converse Intentional Properties" >3, Chisholm cites Ernest
Sosa's "Consciousness of the Self and Present" 14 and says "Ernest Sosa has
developed a perspectival' theory of propositions which, if it is tenable,
enables him to escape some of the difficulties I have attributed to the
propositional theory." Sosa also makes the isomorphism observation, and
notes the extreme similarity between his perspectival theory and Schiffer s
view.)
In view of this isomorphism’ of their views, objections to the one will
be objections to the other. To the Modal Objection of Chapter III, Chisholm
replies in much the same way as Schiffer does: he rejects the intuition on
which it is based. (See his discussion of rigidity on pages 71 - 72 of the
chapter on proper names.) As one of the contemporary originators of the
adverbial theory of perception (and, one might now say, of an adverbial
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theory of belief), Chisholm is, of course, sensitive to the kind of objection
made in Being There ’ of Chapter III. Here is what he says in response to it:
...we must presuppose the concept of functional dependents if yappears in a certain way to x, then the way x is appeared to will
be functionally dependent upon the nature of y. That is to say,
y will be so related to x, that merely by varying continuously
with respect to certain of its properties, one can vary
continuously the way in which x is appeared to. More
specifically, if y is appearing visually to x, then y has properties
which are such that, by varying them, one can vary the way in
which x is visually appeared to, and analogously for the other
sense- modalities.
The functional dependence that relates the appearing object and
the way of being appeared to is also structural since it
essentially involves different parts of the object that appears.
If, for a moment, we permit ourselves the sense-datum
language ( He senses a red appearance ) instead of the language
of being appeared to ( He is appeared to redly ), we can easily
describe this structural relation. The appearance is divisible
into parts which correspond to different parts of the thing that
presents the appearance. The table-top, for example, may
present a uniform visual appearance; yet by varying the colour,
say, of the left half of the table-top we can vary the colour of
the left half of the visual appearance. (If we restrict ourselves
to the language of being appeared to, we cannot thus speak of
the parts' of a way of being appeared to, but we can distinguish
various aspects of the way of being appeared to and we can put
our point by reference to them *5.
Given the previous discussion (in Chapter III) of the problems adverted to
here, and the need and desire for clarity that Chisholm himself has been so
important in highlighting, it is fair to say that the preceding relabels, but
does not solve, the problems. We have not yet been told how, in general, to
distinguish the aspects of ways of being appeared to 16 .
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Levis on Belief and the Two Tubes Puzzle
So far, I have talked almost exclusively about how Chisholm's views
might best be applied to resolve the Two Tubes Puzzle. Lewis' view is quite
similar, but since he himself has written on the persistence version of the
puzzle, I prefer to let him speak for himself:
I see the matter this way. There are two relations of
acquaintance: R and L (having to do with seeing through the
right and left eyes). The narrowly psychological part of the
story concerns egocentric, deje content.... In the first part of the
experiment, Smith self-ascribes being R-acquainted with a red
thing, and with nothing else. In the second part, he goes on
self-ascribing that, but he then also self-ascribes being L-
acquainted with a red thing and nothing else. That's the change
in his belief and knowledge when he opens the left eye. He
does not self-ascribe being R-acquainted and L-acquainted with
the same thing. But nor does he self-ascribe being R-acquainted
and L-acquainted with different things.
Now we widen our attention and take account of the non-
psychological facts. In the first part, he is in fact uniquely R-
acquainted with the spot; thus he believes and knows, de re. of
the spot, that it is red. In the second part, he is also uniquely L-
acquainted with the same spot; which provides a second
sufficient condition for the same conclusion, namely that he
believes and knows, de re. of the spot, that it is red.
Now for a bit of ordinary language. The same combinations of
narrow content plus acquaintance that suffice to make it true
that he believes and knows, de re. of the spot, that it is red (in
other words that he ascribes redness to the spot) also suffice to
make true the ordinary language sentence "He believes (and
knows) that the spot is red." In the first part of the experiment
we have one, and in the second part two, truth- making
combinations for that sentence.
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The sentence has an embedded clause: "the spot is red". The
subject of this clause denotes the spot, the predicate expresses
redness; so this clause has a semantic relation to the ordered
pair of the spot and redness; and thereby it also has a semantic
relation to the set of all worlds where something with the
essence of the spot is red; that is, it has a semantic relation to
two different things that might be called the "singular
proposition" that the spot is red. So Smith has this relation, at
least, to the singular proposition. His narrow psychological state
plus his acquaintanceships jointly make true a belief-and-
knowledge sentence with an embedded clause that corresponds
in a certain way to the singular proposition. Big deal! I don't
terribly mind if somebody wants to say, on this basis, that
Smith believes and knows the singular proposition; but I insist
that the singular proposition that in this roundabout sense he
believes and knows is not at all the same thing as the narrowly
psychological contents that are functionally characterized, that
motivate his action, that more or less obey canons of rationality,
that will be consistent if he's as good a logician as Pierre....
(ellipsis in the original) Narrowly psychological content is
linked only in a roundabout way to embedded clauses of true
ordinary language belief sentences. So you can connect "objects
of belief" to one or to the other; but not to both at once, at least
not without serious equivocation. Say what you like, but
personally I prefer to say "object" to mean the things that are
tightly connected to narrow psychology, and loosely connected
to clauses in belief sentences, not the things that are vice versa.
That way, singular propositions are no good as "objects ". Indeed
propositions generally aren't much good, unless by propositions
you mean egocentric propositions — better known as properties.
But if you go the other way, you can have your propositions and
your singular propositions as objects -- but then the objects
haven't got a lot to do with belief as a psychological
phenomenon 17 .
There is obvious and deep similarity between what Lewis says here and the
resolution of the puzzle that I attribute to Chisholm. Lewis also grants, in the
penultimate sentence of the last paragraph of the quote, the isomorphism
claim that I made above. What is new here is an explicit conception of
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propositions as characterizing "narrowly psychological content". (It is implicit
in Chisholm's cited work, and explicit in some of his unpublished work, on
the Heidelberger/Baker dish-basket case 18 .) I will have a bit (but not much)
more to say about this cluster of issues in the Postscript, where I will
observe that the notion of action is crucially ambiguous in a way that
removes some of the force its use seems to have in Lewis' letter 1 ?
I turn next to views that depart from tradition by postulating a third
element in belief. With an extra element, these triadic views are able to
accommodate both the semantical and psychological roles discussed by
Lewis.
Kaplan's Unhelpful Character
In his famous, unpublished Demonstratives^ David Kaplan develops a
non-traditional analysis of demonstrative belief. Unlike Chisholm and Lewis,
his analysis explicitly includes propositions (-they are represented as sets of
possible worlds in the formal development). It is non-traditional because it
adds to the traditional analysis a third term, which he calls "character".
Kaplan motivates the introduction of a third element by considering
several examples of a sort now familiar here. Suppose, for example, that I
see reflected in a window the image of a man whose pants are on fire.
Pointing at the window, I exclaim, "His pants are on fire". I then realize that
I am the one reflected in the window, scream "my pants are on fire", and roll
around on the ground 21 . According to Kaplan, what is said by my two
utterances - their "content", in Kaplan's terms - is the same; both express the
same individual proposition with me and the property of having inflamed
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pants as its constituents. But the meaning of the two utterances - their
characters
, in Kaplan's term - are different, and it is this difference in
meaning that helps to explain the differences in my behavior on the
occasions of my utterances. Here is a second example: I say, "I am fat", and
you say "I am fat". The content of what each us says is different, since I am
a constituent of what I say, but not of what you say. But the character is the
same. We might also illustrate the character/content distinction using Perry's
Messy Shopper, Augmented and first version: when Perry says, "he is
making a mess and when he later says, "I am making a mess", what he said
was the same - the individual proposition consisting of Perry and the
property of being a mess-maker - but the characters were different, and so
were his (re)actions.
There is certainly a powerful and common-sensical intuitive appeal to
the claim that there is something the same about Perry's two utterances -
their propositional content - as well as something different, this difference
made vivid by the differences in behavior between the two occasions of
utterance. One might felicitously label the difference a difference between
things believed (propositions) and ways of believing them. The work comes
in making clear sense of this apt label in a way that does justice to the
intuitions it gathers together. Let us see what sense Kaplan offers us.
Some terminological preliminaries:
...given a us£ of ...(an) expression, we may ask of what has been
said whether it would have been true or false in various
counterfactual circumstances, and in such counterfactual
circumstances, which are the individuals relevant to
determining the truth value. Thus we must distinguish possible
occasions of use — which 1 call contexts — from possible
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circumstances of evaluation of what was said on a given
occasion of use22 .
Thus when 1 uttered "1 am tat", my utterance occurs in one context, and
when you utter the same (type of) expression, your utterance occurs in a
different context. One important difference between these contexts is that
they have different speakers. It is this difference that makes the utterances
different in content.
What is said in using a given indexical in different contexts may
be different....what is said (is) content . The content of a sentence
in a given context is what has traditionally been called a
proposition2 ^.
1 take content as a notion applying not only to sentences taken
in a context but to any meaningful part of speech taken in a
context. Thus we can speak of the content of a definite
description, an indexical, a predicate, etc. It is contents that are
evaluated in circumstances of evaluation. If the content is a
proposition (i.e., the content of some sentence taken in some
context), the result of evaluation will be a truth value. The
result of evaluating the content of a singular term at a
circumstance will be an object... 24 .
But, as noted, there is something that is the same about the two utterances of
"I am fat", what Kaplan calls their "character". Here is one of his
characterizations of character:
The character of an expression is set by linguistic conventions
and, in turn, determines the content of the expression in every
context. Because character is what is set by linguistic
conventions, it is natural to think of it as meaning in the sense
of what is known by the competent language user 2 5.
For example, a partial statement of a meaning rule of the relevant kind is
T" refers to the speaker or writer
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where the phrase the speaker or writer" refers to the speaker or writer of
the relevant occurrence of the word "I", the agent of the context26 . Since this
rule is incomplete - for example, it does not specify that the indexical does
not express an individual concept, and is instead connotationless - it does not
completely determine the content in each context. If fact, a full statement of
meaning rules would be rather complex, and Kaplan says that "...an exact and
conscious mastery of semantics is [not] a prerequisite of having a[n]...
[individual] proposition as object of thought. 2^ So the use of meaningful
expressions by a competent language user does not require that the user
know of each rule and each expression guided by it that the rule determines
the content of the expression on each possible occasion of its use (i.e., in each
context).
Kaplan offers a very full formal development of his informal
characterization of the quartet of notions: context, circumstances, content
and character. But what has already been quoted tells us that the
distinctions are not drawn finely enough to be of any use in resolving the
Two Tubes Puzzle. To make good use of the intuitions brought out by the
examples we discussed a few paragraphs back, we must find some difference
between Smith s uses of "this" and "that" to help explain why he wonders "Is
this = that?". It is this that Kaplan's quoted characterization of character fails
to give. Smith, we may suppose, is a perfectly competent user of English and
knows as well as any grammarian or semanticist the linguistic conventions
governing the use demonstratives, the "is" of predication, and "red".
Those rules apply to "this" and "that" in the context of Smith s use of them to
give "this is red" and "that is red” the same content in Smith s context of
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utterance: the individual proposition consisting of the spot he actually sees
and the property of being red (-and similarly for "this = this ", "that - that"
and this = that '). But the meaning rules for each of these uttered sentences
are the same28 . So, according to Kaplan s characterization of character, their
characters are the same. The needed difference is not at hand 2^
Another unfortunate limitation of Kaplan s view is that he holds that if
two proper names have the same character (even in a completely
disambiguated language), then any competent speaker of the language
knows that they have the same character^. But as observed in Chapter II,
the Two Tubes Puzzle can be posed just as well as a puzzle about uses of
proper names.
It is, perhaps, doubtful that Kaplan ever intended his
character/content distinction to apply to cases like the Two Tubes Puzzle,
and so the preceding should probably not be taken as criticism of his views,
but rather as an indication of the preliminary and tentative way in which
they are presented. Elsewhere in Demonstratives, however, Kaplan speaks as
if he intends character to include any relevant feature of the utterer s
epistemological situation" (see his discussion of Castor and Pollux), including,
possibly, the nature of the causal connection between the utterer and the
demonstrandum. All of these might be important in determining what
Kaplan calls the "cognitive significance" of thoughts (as opposed to their
contents). With additional features at his disposal, the desired more fine-
grained characterization of ways of believing propositions might be
constructed. But Kaplan himself does not offer any such construction.
H3
We must, therefore, look elsewhere for an appropriately refined
triadic theory of demonstrative belief. We will find it in the work of Mark
Richard.
Richard on Demonstrative Belief: A Stalnaker and a Half
Richard s view resolves the Two Tubes Puzzle (and the Augmented
Messy Shopper) by maintaining that, at least in the cases of indexical and
demonstrative belief, individual propositions are believed under meanings 3 *.
It will aid discussion of Richard s view if we change the persistence version
of the puzzle32 slightly, replacing "this is red" and "that is red" by "this -
this and that = that
, respectively; imagine also appropriate adjustments in
Smith's beliefs. According to Richard, there is just one individual proposition
expressed by Smith s uses of "this = this", "that = that" and "this = that",
namely [0,=,0]. But associated with each of these sentence-uses are three
different meanings under which Smith might believe them. Let us denote the
three meanings by "Ml", "M2", and "M3", respectively; and indicate the belief
relation - now a three-termed relation among a believer, a meaning and a
proposition33 - by "B". Then the assumptions of the puzzle should be
rewritten as follows:
(AR) It is possible that a believer believe, under some meaning,
an individual proposition with a contingent thing other than
himself as a constituent.
(BR) If (AR) is true, then B(Smith, Ml. [0 ,=,0]) and B(Smith, M2,
[0 =0 ]).
(CR) If B(Smith, Ml, 10,= 01) and B(Smith, M2, 10,=,0]), then
B(Smith, M3, [0,=,0D.
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(DR) It is not the case that B(Smith, M3, [0,-0]).
Richard s view denies (CR) and affirms the rest. (CR) is false on his view
because it does not follow from Smith’s believing [0,«,0l under Ml and M2,
that he also believes it under M3. Let us take a closer look at the nature of
meanings, according to Richard, so that we can see exactly how he accounts
for the failure of this inference and the falsity of (CR).
..Jet us introduce some structure to meanings. Instead of
thinking of a meaning as simply a function from contexts to
propositions34
, think of it as a pair «Sj s„>,Mn> (n>0), where
each s, is a (demonstrative) term-meaning - a function from
contexts to individuals - and Mn is an n-place predicate
meaning - a function from contexts to n-place properties. (I will,
for the sake of expediency, identify n-place properties with
functions from n-tuples of possible individuals to sets of
possible worlds; propositions with zero-place properties - viz..
sets of worlds.) The proposition such a meaning yields in a
context c is...the proposition p such that w is in p exactly if w is
in [Mn(c))(<Sj(c),s2(c) sn(c)>)35
Some of the philosophical background for the formal development is given in
an important footnote.
1 presume the following....There are what we might call modes
of demonstrating’ things....These modes are such that the same
mode can be used in different contexts or several times in one
context. It is only when she' lor this! is accompanied by a
mode of demonstrating...that it refers to an object.
Furthermore, although she' plus mode m of demonstrat-
ing...may pick out different objects in different contexts, she'
accompanied by one mode of demonstrating picks out the same
object every time it is used in a context....
The meaning...of she', then, is roughly this: she', accompanied
by a mode of demonstrating, functions as a directly referential
term; it denotes, relative to a context, what its accompanying
mode of demonstrating demonstrates.
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Thus, in giving formal representatives for sentences such as
those mentioned in the text, what we really represent is the
sentence type and aspects of the mode of demonstration.. .We
thus represent two occurrences of she with the same term if
and only if they are accompanied by the same mode of
demonstration .. w.
Demonstrative term- meanings and modes of demonstrating are thus directlv
correlated with one another in Richard's view. What Richard has to say
about them is clearest in his discussion of property attribution by
demonstrative users:
It would seem that to believe the proposition expressed
(relative to a context c) by a sentence in which demonstratives
occur is to have a de re belief with respect to the objects
denoted, in c, by the demonstratives in the sentence. If one has
a re belief with respect to an object, then one may be said to
attribute certain properties to the object. However, it does not
follow, from the fact that x and y each believe the proposition p
expressed in c by a sentence S(d), d a demonstrative occurring
in S and denoting u in c, that every property which x attributes
to u, in virtue of his believing p, is one which y attributes to u,
in virtue of this belief. For which properties one attributes to
an object is determined by the meaning under which one’s
belief is held 37.
An ascription of belief a believes that S\ S a sentence in which
demonstratives occur, not only implies that the proposition
expressed by S is believed, but that certain properties are
attributed to the referents of the demonstratives in S. What
properties the ascription implies are attributed depends, in
turn, upon the meaning of S....
Let us consider how we might give a systematic development of
this proposal....
Let m - «Sj ...,s
fl
>,Mn> be a meaning. The intuitive answer to the
question - When does the agent of a context c attribute a
property P, in virtue of believing under m? - is as follows.
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Consider, first of aiJ, what one gets' if one (a) replaces Mn with
M“(c) (viz,, replaces the meaning M“ with the property which is
its value in c); (b) replaces each Sj either with its value in c or a
variable; (c) doesn t replace distinct Sj s with the same variable.
Call such entities the proto-oroperties associated with m in c.
(For example, the proto- properties associated with
m
i
- «(ti), (yj}>, (F2 !)>
-which could be identified with the meaning of "F2
1
t
ly l "38 . m a
context in which "t
t
M





Proto- properties associated with
m2 = <<(t l },(t2)>,{F2 l }>
in such a context are ail of the above and
(iv) «x,x\P>.)
To each proto- property there corresponds, in a rather obvious
way, a property. For example: to (ii) corresponds the one-place
property P ! such that w e PKut) iff w e P(<u
t ,
u>); to (iii)
corresponds the two- place property P2 such that w e P2(<u
t
,u2>)
iff w e P(<ui,u2>); to (iv) corresponds the one- place property P3
such that w e P3(uj) iff w e P(<ut,ut>).
...An agent attributes a property P, in virtue of holding a belief
under a meaning m iff P corresponds to one of the proto-
properties associated with m relative to the agent s context^.
To provide a more specific example, we can consider what properties Smith,
the agent of the context of the Two Tubes Puzzle, attributes to the spot he
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sees during the first minute of the persistence version of the puzzle
indicated at the beginning of this section. When he thinks to himself, 1 this «
this
,
the denoted object is the spot, 0, and the property is the relational





( 1 ) and (2) both correspond to the same property: being identical to 0. (4)
corresponds to the property of being self-identical, which everything has.
(3), we might say, expresses the relational property of sameness: "x and y
are the same thing". According to Richard's view, Smith attributes all of these
properties to the spot he sees (in virtue of holding the belief under the
meaning of "this = this '). The situation becomes more complex at the
beginning of the second minute, when we apply the preceding to the longer
sentence, this = this and that = that . (I defer, for a moment, consideration
of the complete sentence including, "and is this = that?"’) Stricture (c) from
the passage last quoted requires that distinct demonstrative meanings,
associated with distinct modes of demonstrating, not be replaced by the
same variable. So in forming the proto-properties associated with the
conjunctive utterance, there will be many new proto-properties generated
by the use of additional variables, since we are not allowed to replace both
"this"' and "that"' by the same variable; however, two occurrences of one may
be replaced by different variables. Let the predicate of the conjunctive
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sentence - x rxj and x 2=x 2
"
- denote the property T. The complete set of




(6) «Xj,x j,x 2 ,x 2>,T>
(7) «x 1)x 3 ,x 2 ,x4>,T>






(6) is of particular importance here because the property associated with it
is what Richard calls a "picture", a picture, as he would put it, held by Smith.
The intuition motivating our semantical account is that an
ascription is true provided it ascribes belief in a proposition
which is believed and the ascription doesn't imply anything
false about what pictures are held by the believer* 0 .
The picture associated with (8) is not held by Smith, nor is the picture
associated with
(9) «x j ,x 1 1x 2 ,x 2 ,x j ,x 2 >, T+>
gotten from the sentence (as Smith might, but does not use it), "this = this
and that = that and this = that"* 1 . The pictures associated with (8) and (9)
both imply that Smith believes there is just one spot that he is seeing with
both eyes, and so are not pictures held by him.
Further use of pictorial language may help us to see more clearly what
is being proposed here as a solution to the Two Tubes Puzzle. The scene
confronting Smith consists initially of a little picture and, during the second
minute, the big picture* 2 . If we allow ourselves reference to the possible
worlds semantics used to represent Smith's beliefs, we can describe much of
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the big picture in this way: Smith surveys seituples of objects and believes
the following to be facts about them: whatever objects are in the first two
positions bear sameness to one another, as well as having self-identity;
similarly for the objects in the second two positions. Whatever objects are in
the latter two positions are also seen by Smith to have self-identity (of
course), but Smith cannot tell whether or not they bear sameness to one
another. If we were to fill out the picture corresponding to a fuller statement
of Smith s beliefs about the spot, we would add still more elements to the n-
tuple, and more properties reflective of Smith s beliefs (for example, his
belief expressed by this is red and that is red"). In whatever n-tuples Smith
surveys, all the objects will be visually indiscernible for him.
(Given what Richard says in the quoted passage from page 444, and in
the rest of his essay, he seems also to be committed to describing Smith as
simultaneously attributing to each of the objects in the sextuples the
property of being identical to 0. (See also (5), above.) I do not understand
how this could be made consistent with Smith s ignorance, but fear there is a
crucial lapse in my understanding here. Alternatively, it may be that
Richard s semi-formal presentation of pictures, proto-properties and
attribution does not do full justice to his intuitions, insights and
presumptions as expressed elsewhere in his essay.]
I am unable to see how this part of the application of Richard's view -
involving meanings and the property attributions associated with them in a
context - differs significantly, if at all, from an appropriate application of
Stalnaker's diagonalization to the sentence in which Smith expresses his
wondering. Application of Richard s picture theory of meaning seems to
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require that the picture associated with the sentence be the diagonal of the
propositional function concept for the sentence s predicate. This is a
property (function from worlds - or possible situations - to individuals) had
in common by all and only those objects visually indiscernible from the spot
actually seen by Smith, and which also appear’ somewhere in a scene
visually indiscernible from the one Smith actually sees. (Again, it is hard for
me to square this with the letter of Richard s exposition, but it seems
demanded by his intuitions.) New to Richard s view are the individual
proposition 10,-0] as the persistent object of Smith s belief, and the object 0
as the persistent object of Smith s attributions.
Although there is that much persistence guaranteed by Richard s view,
I think it is not enough; it may also be inadequate to the presumptions he
states in his footnote 8, quoted above. Here is what I believe to be a natural
and appealing re-description of the persistence version of the Two Tubes
Puzzle. There is a way in which Smith believes the individual proposition he
expresses by "this = this ", and he believes that individual proposition in that
very way, wR , for the full two minutes. There is a different way, wL , in
which Smith believes the same individual proposition, expressed by him
using that - that ", during the second minute. These ways (what Richard
calls "meanings ') have structure - enough so that it is correct to say that
when he wonders "Is this = that ", the part of wR associated with "this" and
the part of wL associated with "that" are two different parts used to build a
third way, ws , and a fourth way, wD , in neither of which Smith believes that
same individual proposition. (ws belongs with "this = that"; wD with "this =k
that".) If anything is clear about modes of demonstrating, it is clear that
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there are just two such modes to be found during the whole two minute
period, one for each of this and 'that
", and it is these modes that make the
difference between wR and wL . But this is not how things are on Richard s
view«3. The change in scene at noon induces a radical change in picture. The
picture during the first minute must apply to 0, the spot seen; but during the
second minute, the picture may apply to spots merely visually indiscernible
from 0. Although it is a consequence of Richard's view in application to the
puzzle that the picture is in fact attributed to 0 because Smith actually
perceives it, there seems to be nothing in the big picture itself to secure this
attribution. The latter lack of security signals what appears to be a change
in the mode of demonstrating associated with Smith s uses of "this" between
the first and second minutes of the puzzle. I find it a signal of an
undesirable consequence. Richard's motivation of his own view leads me to
think that he would agree. In defense of Richard’s view (or what I here take
it to be), it might be pointed out that it does not follow from a believer's
being perceptually acquainted with an object in one way for a certain period
of time that his associated demonstrative beliefs remain the same. This is
analogous to observing, in sympathy with Stalnaker's view, that, at noon, a
whole new class of possible situations suddenly become relevant; and that, in
some sense, Smith is powerless then to distinguish his actual situation from
others among them. Perhaps this is, after all, the moral to be drawn. I
would note, however, that I have not relied on the assumption that the
aforementioned inference is a valid one. I rely instead on an appeal to
intuition; and since I have this intuition, I should still prefer the view that
seemed to be promised by Richard; demonstrative beliefs constructed from
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just two modes of demonstrating (or ways of being acquainted with4*)
spot seen, one of which persists for the full two minutes and picks out the
spot actually seen, and no other possible spot.
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Notes for Chapter VI
I Attitudes De Dicto and De Se
", Philosophical Review LXXXVII1 (October
1979), page 516.
2Ihe First Person, University of Minnesota Press, 1981, page 28.
3lbid„ pages 29 - 30.
4 Ibid.. page 31.
S lbid.
6lbid.. page 46.
7 lbid.. page 50.
8See ibid., page 51, and pages 126 - 128.
9 lbid.. page 50.
10 Ibid.. page 96.
II Ibid., pages 110-1 12.
t2or, <X is fat at T,<S,t».
13 journal of Philosophy. Vol. LXXIX (October, 1982) page 544fn7.
Hin James Tomberlin, ed., Agent. Language and the World: Essays Presented
to Hector-Neri Castafteda. Hackett Publishing Company, 1982.
*5 Ibid, page 94.
16See also the papers by Casullo, cited in the notes to Chapter III.
17letter to the author, March 19, 1984.
ls The De Re Intentional Attitudes", Section "A Further Puzzle", pages 11 -12,
Heidelberger Memorial Conference, April, 1983-
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For a defense of the need for egocentric propositions — better known as
properties in action theory, see Myles Brand, Intending and Acting
,
Bradford Books/M.I.T. Press, 1984, Chapter 4.
-°dittograph, UCLA, 1977. An abbreviated version was published as "On the
Logic of Demonstratives ", in P. A. French, T. E. Uehling, Jr., H. K. Wettstein,
ec*s
> Contemporary Perspective s in the Philosophy of Language
,
University of
Minnesota Press, 1 979, pages 401-412.
21
Ibid., page 64.
22 Ibid.. page 1
2
23 Ibid.. page 19
24 Ibid.. pages 20-21.
25 Ibid.. page 25
26 Ibid.. page 24.
27 Ibid.. page 1 13fn34.
28Recall that the example works as well with two tokens of the same type, or
two uses of the same token.
29 Are there two contexts here, one for each use of each token? even in the
conjunctive utterance, "this is red and that is red"? If so, we need to know
much more than Kaplan tells us about how in general contexts are
distinguished from one another.
30 Ibid.. pages 98 - 99.
31 "Direct Reference and Ascriptions of Belief", journal of Philosophical Logic
12 (1983) pages 425 - 452.
32See "The Persistence of the Puzzle" in Chapter V.
33at least for indexical and demonstrative belief.
34as Kaplan does for characters, his version of meanings.
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35"Direct Reference and Ascriptions of Belief", op, cit. page 432.
36Ibid., page 449fn8.
37 Ibid.. pages 442 - 443.
38for example, "she is taller than you"
3^ Direct Reference and Ascriptions of Belief", op. cit.. page 444. 1 ignore the
trivial use- mention confusion in this passage that treats the Sj as both terms
and meanings.
40 Ibid„ page 446.
41 A similar observation holds for "this = this and that = that and this^ that".
42
1 learned this phrase from Professor Robert Paul Wolff.
43Compare Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference Oxford University Press,
1982, pages 196n4 and 283; but see also pages 299 - 301.
44 It is my contention that there are some situations - even if not Smith's
situation - in which the involved ways of being acquainted will pick out the
subject constituent of the belief and no other possible object, and where that
constituent is, unlike a sense-datum, a publicly accessible' object other than
the believer and the time of belief. The arguments and considerations
presented in this essay may even lead to the conclusion that these ways
must be taken as primitive. This would not be the first time in history of
philosophy that such a course recommended itself. See, for example,
Nicholas White, Plato on Knowledge and Reality. Hackett Pub. Co., 1976. One
may, I think, take such ways as primitive without running afoul of Burge's
anti-individualistic animadversions in Section IV of his "Belief and
Synonymy ", journal of Philosophy (March, 1978) pages 1 19 - 138. See also
page 6 of his "Individualism and Psychology
", unpublished manuscript of a
paper read at the M.I.T./Sloan Conference on Cognitive Science, May, 1984.
POSTSCRIPT: WHY THE PUZZLE REMAINS A PUZZLE
Writing in 1903, G. E. Moore said, "There is ... no question of how
we are to get outside the circle of our own ideas and
sensations. Merely to have a sensation is already to be outside
that circle." I would hold, in almost parallel fashion, "there is no
question of how we are to get outside the circle of our own
conceptions. Merely to believe a singular proposition is already
to be outside that circle." 1
The view - one might say hope - expressed in the passage just quoted
is one that I once shared with Professor Heidelberger. Indeed, I came to
graduate study in philosophy with the requisite sympathies, which were
then refined under the tutelage of Heidelberger and Gettier. However,
reflection on the puzzles about belief developed in this essay has convinced
me that the price of holding the view is too high and the hope is forlorn. This
is not to deny that individual propositions have some role to play in the
analysis of belief, but it is to assert that the simple picture envisaged in the
above quotation is over-simple.
It is over-simple in much the same way as Moore s own view was. It
did not take Moore long to recognize that the sensations of which he spoke in
1903 were a great deal more like the ideas inside the circle than he granted
initially. And in section IV of his "A Defence of Common Sense" 2 and in
"Visual Sense Data" 3 he expresses his sympathies with and reservations
about representational theories of perception. Although the philosophical
problems that sense data were introduced to solve were not the same as the
problems discussed in this essay, the problems are sufficiently similar so
that they have partially overlapping solutions. (Although problems in
accounting for illusion motivated sense datum theory, and the current
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puzzles about belief are just as puzzling when presented as involving
veridical perception and true belief, both sets of problems arise in trying to
make room for doubts about the objects in belief and perception in a naively
realistic theory.) In Chapter III, Russell and Sense Data", we saw that sense
datum theory can provide a solution to the Two Tubes Puzzle. More
important, the idea that such puzzles can be resolved by restricting the
possible constituents of the objects of belief was one that was familiar long
before they were given a linguistic turn, and, judging from the work of
Schiffer, Chisholm, Lewis and Brand, it is an idea that continues to enjoy
some favor. Much of the current debate would be enhanced by an occurrent
and lively appreciation of the historical parallels here.
Given my initial sympathies with naive realism in philosophy of
perception and philosophy of language, I have a strong preference for views
that do not restrict the possible objects of belief and perception in the ways
that the just-mentioned theorists do. The preference has this much rational
basis: First, all the theorists we have considered have had at least to restrict
the circumstances under which propositions can be believed. If one can
avoid an additional restriction on the possible constituents of propositions,
and make do with just the restriction in circumstance, this seems a desirably
less restrictive course to take. Second, I have argued that those who favor,
in Lewis' term, egocentric propositions will need to allow4 spatial location
indexicals for merely apparent spatial locations to be essential indexicals, as
are T* and "now". (Adverbial theories of perception and adverbial theories
of belief face the same problem in dealing with perceptual belief.) This
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seems little different from adopting sense datum theory, and about as
attractive to the once-naively realistic.
There is another point of deep affinity between the solutions
motivated by Arguments from Illusion and friends of egocentric
propositions; it usually enters contemporary discussion under the banner of
Methodological Solipsism. The banner is carried by many, and it is not
always clear that all who parade beneath it march to the same beat. David
Lewis provides an especially vivid and forthright expression of the version
relevant here. In the letter from him quoted in Chapter VI, he says,
...I insist that the singular proposition that in this roundabout
sense ...(Smith) believes and knows is not at all the same thing
as the narrowly psychological contents that are functionally
characterized, that motivate his action, that more or less obey
canons of rationality, that will be consistent if he's as good a
logician as Pierre.... Narrowly psychological content is linked
only in a roundabout way to embedded clauses of the true
ordinary language belief sentences. So you can connect "objects
of belief" to one or to the other; but not to both at once, at least
not without serious equivocation.
And in his "Attitudes De Dicto and DeSe ', he writes,
The main purpose of assigning objects of attitudes is, I take it,
to characterize states of the head; to specify their causal roles
with respect to behavior, stimuli, and one another. If the
assignment of objects depends partly on something besides the
state of the head, it will not serve this purpose. The states it
characterizes will not be the occupants of the causal roles.
(The New Theory of References teaches that meanings ain't in
the head. That may be right - it depends on which of the many
sorts of semantic values that new theorists of reference must
distinguish best deserve the name meanings If it is right, it
applies inter alia to the sentences whereby we express our
beliefs to other and to ourselves. But the proper moral is not
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that beliefs ain t in the head. The proper moral is that beliefs
are ill -characterized by the meanings of the sentences that
express them....)
Mean what you will by "object of attitude ". But if you mean
something that is not determined by the state of the head, and
that cannot do the job of characterizing states of the head by
their causal roles, then I think you had better introduce
something else that can do the job. I would prefer to reserve
the term "object of an attitude" for that something else&.
The final punches come in these two passages:
Beliefs are in the head;... beliefs de re in general, are not.
Beliefs de re are not really beliefs. They are states of affairs
that obtain in virtue of the relations of the subject s beliefs to
the res in question7 .
...it seems to me unfortunate that the study of the objects of
belief has become entangled with the semantic analysis of
attributions of belief8 .
About these statements by Lewis, Perry comments,
Th(ese) remarks leave me baffled. ... Given the difference
between belief as evidence about the world and belief as
explanation of the believer's actions, these claims seem like vast
oversimplifications, which too easily lead us to think that our
way of reporting beliefs is not "straightforward ". Compare,
"Vision is in the head. " Surely, in some sense, true: the eyes and
visual centers of the brain are all in the head. It does not follow
that the point of saying what people see is mainly to describe
their heads, or that, to the extent that we do report perception
for that purpose, the expressions will refer to what occurs in the
head9 .
Perry's analogy with vision is especially apt here, given the similarity
between sense datum theory and egocentric proposition theory. To the
extent that Lewis' remarks are intended to have persuasive power, they
seem to me to trade on one of two relevant senses of "action" (or "behavior ),
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and correlatively, on one sense of "head state" (or "state of mind"). Suppose
that Smith hallucinates a scene exactly like that in the psychological
experiment, and, desiring to touch what he thinks he sees through his right
eye, reaches out with his right arm in an attempt to touch the red spot seen.
In one sense of action", he performs the same action as he would perform if
he were to perform the same bodily motions in the real experimental
circumstances. Same action, same belief" in both cases, Lewis urges. But
one needn't agree. Perhaps there is something the same, or similar, in the
veridical and hallucinatory cases. But, one might insist with vigor equal to
Lewis', the actions (and head states) are different: after all, Smith touches
the red spot in the latter, but not in the former, and no actual red spot is
involved in causing the action in the former case. (Only in the latter case is
there a reciprocal causal relation', to use terminology from Chapter V.) So,
one might say, about the latter case but not the former case, we should
explain Smith's action as involving a belief in an individual proposition with
the red spot as a constituent: "different action, different belief
" 10
.
Is the issue merely a verbal issue about what to call "objects of
attitudes"? (Lewis seems to suggest as much.) Given my realist sympathies,
I think it is a substantive issue, but this is not the place to begin a long
discussion of how those sympathies bear on this issue 11 . What does seem
clear to me is that the "methodological" part of methodological solipsism
provides weak support at best for the decision Lewis makes. (Lewis own
functionalist views support him here, but others - e.g., Fodor - are not
similarly or so well supported.) One must have very sharp philosophical
axes to grind to restrict the methodology of psychology and cognitive science
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to just those situations in which no reference is made to objects outside the
circle of the subject s own ideas. What could possibly prompt such an a
priori restriction on what psychologists are allowed to study? A desire to
makes things easy? Certainly research psychologists themselves have shown
considerable and laudable interest in how subjects are related to their
environments. Unless these restrictions are merely verbal - "it's not
psychology if it s not solipsistic” - 1 find nothing to recommend them as
either descriptive or normative statements about psychology. It would be
easier for me to understand Cartesian solipsism as the motivation for
egocentric propositional theories than it is to understand methodological
solipsism as a force in their favor. But proponents of that sort of solipsism
are difficult to find nowadays.
Because of my realist sympathies, and the apparently common-
sensical need to at least leave room for reference to objects outside the mind
in doing psychology, I favor a view that incorporates individual propositions
with as little restriction as possible on their possible constituents. Hence, if I
am forced to choose from among eitant theories, I must choose either
Stainaker's view or Richard s. (Unfortunately for me, both of these views
counsel more flexibility about rigidity of belief than J feel comfortable
accepting; I am reluctant to give up on a paradigm of rigidity and the
persistence of belief it brings.) Is there any good reason for choosing one of
these over the other? Richard s pictures carry the information contained in
Stainaker’s diagonal propositions 12
,
and their use also guarantees that,
despite a change in picture, all the pictures that Smith holds remain pictures
of the very same object. For this reason, I would choose Richard s view, but
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as I said in Chapter VI, I think a still better view would have pictures that
themselves pick out the spot itself, that pick it out in the same way
throughout Smith s acquaintance with it through his right eye, and that make
merely visually indiscernible spots irrelevant* 3 .
I do not know how a better view could be constructed* 4 . My goal in
this essay has been to show that a better view than any we’ve got is needed




1Herbert Heidelberger, 'Beliefs and Propositions: Comments on Clark",
Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. V, University of Minnesota Press 1979
page 531.
2Pjiilosophical Papers. Humanities Press, 1959, pages 53 - 58.
3in C. A. Mace, ed., British Philosophy in Mid-Century George Allen and
Unwin, 1957, pages 205 - 211.
4See the qualification in note 50 to Chapter III.
5-the arguments for which provide the basis for the arguments in Chapter L
^p. cit.. page 526.
7 I_bid., page 538. Compare: Tyler Burge, "Other Bodies", in Andrew
Woodfield, ed., Thought and Object. Oxford University Press, 1982, page
1 19n4: "...knowing is not a mental state."
8 Ibid., page 54 lfnl 6.
9 "Perception, Action and the Structure of Believing", to appear in a
Festschrift for Paul Grice edited by Richard Grandy and Richard Warner.
,0For a forceful statement along these lines against Methodological Solipsism
- the best I've found - see Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference. Oxford
University Press, 1982, pages 200 - 204.
uFor further help, see Tyler Burge, "Individualism and Psychology", M.l.T.
Sloan Conference on Cognitive Science, May, 1984, unpublished manuscript;
and references therein.
t2-and thus Richard s view avoids an objection that Stalnaker makes, at the
end of "indexical Belief", against an early version of Perry's use of belief
states.
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15 [n his Direct Reference and Propositional Attitudes" (unpublished
manuscript, 1985), Scott Soames presents a Richardian theory that lacks some
of the defects of Richard s own view. Soames' view does have the
consequence, which he himself considers genuinely counterintuitive, of
assigning true to the sentence, "I believe that this = that" as it would be used
by Smith of the Two Tubes case. Nor is Soames at present able to answer the
question. ’Why, if Smith does believe this proposition, and has word for
word metalinguistic knowledge of its expression, is he unwilling to assent to
this = that?” Soames' position thus appears to share a defect with the view
of Boer and Lycan, op, cit.; see page 460n20. They subsequently adopted a
different and triadic analysis that they call "two schemism '. Unfortunately,
this triadic analysis also embraces Methodological Solipsism and seems to
agree in matters of cognitive dynamics with the views of Stalnaker and
Richard; it is, in addition, avowedly and essentially Functionalist. See
William Lycan, Toward a Homuncular Theory of Believing ", Cognition and
Brain Theory 4(1981).
l4For discussion of a potentially important trifurcation, see Nathan Salmon s
review of Leonard Linsky, Names and Descriptions in journal of Philosophy
(August, 1979), pages 436 - 452, on three senses of "sense". Using Salmon's
distinction, we might ask, "What must be added to sense 2 to get sense3
?"
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